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ABSTRACT 
      One of the reoccurring themes in international relations scholarship over the last fifty 
years has been the idea that the United States has undergone a decline. The United States 
established itself as a hegemon in the years following World War 2 thanks to a preeminence in 
power. However, it has been argued that the hegemony of the United States may now be at 
risk and that the American power advantage is shrinking in the face of rising challengers. This 
thesis examines American decline through an extensive literature review followed by an 
analysis of fifteen metrics of power capabilities along with three indicators of the liberal 
hegemonic order which the United States is trying to maintain. The results of this analysis 
demonstrate that the United States has undergone a relative decline in state power capabilities 
in recent years which has destabilized the American led liberal hegemonic order. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
The inaugural address of President Donald Trump painted an image of the United States 
as a dystopian economic wasteland with a crumbling infrastructure, a dilapidated military, 
unimaginable crime rates, and a failing foreign policy. This grim outlook on America’s future 
captures the essence of the argument that we are nearing the end of the American century and 
that the United States is set to go the way of previous dominant powers. Others have argued 
that while inevitable, the U.S. is still the global superpower and will not be replaced for many 
decades. My thesis will examine the prospect of decline and its effect on the liberal world 
order.  
 My interest in this topic stems from my interest in international relations, grand 
strategy, and power transitions. As an undergraduate at Iowa State University pursuing my 
degree in history and political science, I spent a great deal of time studying the rise and fall of 
the city states of ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, and the major powers of 19th and 20th 
century Europe. With the prospect of American decline becoming an increasingly salient issue 
in American politics and political science research, I was immediately interested in delving 
deeper into this topic.  
 The issue of American decline is important to a great many people including policy 
makers, academics, business professionals, and the average voter. For decades the United 
States has been the source of a large portion of global economic production, established a vast 
international security network, and has been at the center of the global balance of power. 
Political leaders around the world, both present and future, will need to contend with the 
possibility and repercussions of a decline of a benevolent hegemon and fundamentally 
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important state. Some see the decline or replacement of such a prominent state to be the 
herald of large scale systemic changes.  
Scholars, authors, and pundits have discussed ways that the United States can mitigate 
or successfully manage its own decline while others have written on ways in which the United 
States can prolong its dominance in the world through one strategy or another. However, here 
are few who believe that the United States will remain at the top of the balance of power 
indefinitely. Eventually, the United States will be surpassed either by the rapid rise of another 
state or through the absolute fall of American capabilities. The choices and skill of our elected 
leaders will determine how we weather such a transition, and thus it is important for those in 
authority to pay attention to this issue and identify what options they have for addressing it.   
 This issue is also important to voters who see their country as being on the wrong track. 
In one poll done by Gallup, 50% of respondents believe that China has already surpassed the 
United States as an economic superpower.1 In another poll by Rasmussen Reports, potential 
voters were asked if they believed America was moving in the right direction; 59% of 
respondents claimed that the country was on the wrong track.2 The mantra of the 2016 
Republican candidate for President was that he would “make America great again.” This would 
seem to indicate a belief that the United States is no longer “great,” or at least is no longer as 
“great” as it once was. While the slogan is painfully vague, it does capture a recurring sentiment 
among international relations scholars and political elites. The idea that the United States may 
                                                          
1 Lydia Saad, “Americans See China as Top Economy Now, but U.S. in Future.” Gallup. 22 February, 2016, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/189347/americans-china-top-economy-future.aspx  
2 “Right Direction or Wrong Track.” Rasmussen Reports.  12 March, 2017. 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/top_stories/right_direction_wrong_track_apr3  
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be in decline or on the brink of losing its position at the top of the global hierarchy has put 
forward by numerous policymakers and researchers during the last seventy years. But today it 
seems that the idea may be closer to the truth than in previous decline panics. The liberal 
global system that the United States established after World War 2, and expanded during the 
Cold War, appears to be eroding or in some cases ending as calls for increased protectionism 
grow, and major geopolitical conflict appear more likely. 
 Lastly, U.S. decline is important to the international community as a whole. As will be 
discussed later, the prospect of America being challenged as the preeminent power in the 
global system, or even replaced in time, can have major consequences for the international 
economic and security institutions that arose owing to its hegemony. The decline of American 
economic power may have major repercussions on international business, trade, and finance. 
With the U.S. dollar as the leading global reserve currency, a decline of the United States 
economy could send shockwaves into every other economy on Earth. Rising and increasingly 
assertive powers in China and Russia have begun to balance against American foreign policy 
and are expanding their own spheres of influence. The rising tensions in Eastern Europe and in 
the South China Sea for example, have raised serious concerns that the world order may be 
eroding. America’s capacity and willingness to respond to these new challenges may be 
changing as the gap between the hegemon and its challengers continues to shrink. 
 What follows is an extensive literature review aimed at examining some of the most 
influential concepts in international relations pertaining to hegemony. Following my literature 
review will be a section discussing the theoretical foundation with which I have designed my 
research and interpreted my results. A data and methods section will detail how I will go about 
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examining national power and U.S. hegemony. Lastly my thesis will conclude with a brief 
discussion and summary of the results and potential areas for additional research.   
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 A great deal of scholarship has been focused on the prospect of U.S. dominance and its 
eventual decline. This debate about American decline is not new; In fact, it has been a recurring 
theme in academic debate for decades. According to Josef Joffe, the United States has gone 
through periods of perceived decline five of the last six decades. Most recently, a new wave of 
declinism has begun in the face of the Great Recession of 2008, slow American economic 
recovery, and rapid militarization and modernization in China.3  
This of course raises the question; Is the current debate about American decline just 
another exaggeration, or could the sun finally be setting on Pax Americana? Before attempting 
to answer this question, I survey the established literature to better understand the debate and 
the established theoretical field as well as to see what other contributions have been made. My 
literature review has focused on several prominent works on international power structures, 
hegemonic theory, and system transitions. I will start by examining the concept of national 
power, the vital yet ambiguous bedrock of international relations and hegemonic theory. I 
follow this with a broad overview of the major theories on hegemony and its role in 
international relations. Lastly, I will review the scholarship on American hegemony specifically 
in the 20th century and the potential challengers to America preeminence in the 21st century. 
My literature review can cover only a fraction of the many volumes of material written on the 
subject. However, I feel I have considered the most prominent and influential works on the 
subject of national power and American hegemony.  
                                                          
3 Josef Joffe, “The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America's Decline,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 5 (2009): 21-22  
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State Power 
 Any discussion of the decline of a state or the establishment or shift of hegemony 
requires a discussion about power. However, state power, as many political scientists have 
found, is a vague yet vital concept. What exactly is meant by power? How can it be measured? 
What relationship does one state’s power have to the international system? A.F.K. Organski 
correctly observed; “In a way, it is easier to list those nations that are powerful than to specify 
of what their power consists.”4 Some scholars have dedicated their entire careers to studying 
the questions surrounding this allusive yet all-important concept. In my review of the literature 
on hegemony, I found that the overwhelming majority of sources cited a preponderance of 
power as a precondition for establishing hegemony. As the offensive realist John Mearsheimer 
puts it; “Great powers, I argue, are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their 
rivals, with hegemony as their final goal.”5 In this section, I will examine some of the pitfalls that 
authors can fall into while defining power and then move on to some of the important works 
that have helped to shape the way we think of power.  
When discussing state power, there exist several traps that scholars must avoid. One 
trap is the flawed tendency to see economic resource dominance as the sole defining 
characteristic of national power.6 Preponderance in wealth and natural resources does not 
always mean that a state will achieve a desired outcome. The United States for example, has for 
decades been viewed as the most powerful nation in the world thanks to its superiority in 
                                                          
4 Alfred Organski, World Politics (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1968), 102. 
5 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 29. 
6 Martin Smith, Power in the Changing Global Order: The U.S., Russia, and China (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 4. 
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financial markets, economic output, manufacturing and energy production, and military 
spending. Despite this resource superiority, it has failed to achieve many of its major foreign 
policy objectives.7 Intangible qualities of a state and the skill with which a state’s capabilities 
are applied can mean the difference between success or failure.  
 Another trap is the tendency of authors to discuss power in their work without giving an 
operational definition of what power is or how we can measure it.8 In The Rise and Fall of Great 
Powers, Paul Kennedy discusses at length the development of modern, powerful states and 
how they can decline or collapse altogether. Yet despite his extensive research on the power of 
some of the most influential states, he never provides a concrete definition of what he 
considers power to be, rather, he looks at various resources and the discusses changes in the 
distribution of power among states.9  
 Authors have tended to focus on different categories of state resources as they form 
their definition of power. Military and economic metrics are the most common areas where 
researchers have operationalized state power. Some have looked at political and social 
explanations by defining power as “influence,” which unlike “power,” has the virtue of being 
used as a verb and focusing on the success of actors in changing another actor’s behavior. Still, 
a few authors have combined these areas to conceptualize power as a combination of 
economic, military, and political variables. 
                                                          
7 Christopher Layne, “Impotent Power? Re-examining the Nature of America's Hegemonic Power,” National 
Interest, no. 85 (October 2006): 41. 
8 Smith, Power in the Changing Global Order, 4. 
9 Ibid, 4-5. 
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 In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, John Mearsheimer places power in the context 
of the ability to triumph in armed conflict. He emphasizes the importance of the use of power 
to defeat potential enemies, and thus divides power into two categories, potential power and 
actual power. Potential power refers to a state’s population size and its wealth, since these are 
among the building blocks of military power.10 Actual power by contrast refers to an existing 
army and the supporting air and naval forces. Mearsheimer places a special emphasis on the 
importance of land forces in determining the power of a state, arguing that they are the central 
element to military power thanks to their ability to conquer and hold territory.11 Mearsheimer 
argues that concentration of power in a single actor raises the probability of war. Because the 
international system is characterized by anarchy, all states seek to maximize their power 
relative to their neighbors, creating distrust and fear from any perceived power gap. This fear 
can lead to arms races and eventually conflict between states.12  
 One of the most important issues concerning national power are shifts in the 
distribution of power that can affect the global hierarchy. These shifts were studied extensively 
by A.F.K. Organski who pioneered power transition theory. According to Organski, “Power, 
then, is the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one’s own ends.”13 
Power then exists not in warehouses but in the relationship among actors in which one actor is 
to influence others into doing something it may not wish to. Organski suggests that in order to 
measure a state’s power, we would need to look into the past at any disagreements or conflicts 
                                                          
10 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 43. 
11 Ibid  
12 Ibid, 44-45. 
13 Organski, World Politics, 104. 
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between the state in question and other states with which it has disagreed. Whichever state 
achieved its desired outcome would then be considered more powerful.14 This would give us an 
accurate picture of which state is more powerful, but it is inherently flawed. Organski points 
out that to use this method would help us to explain which actor was powerful at the time, but 
it would offer only limited insight as to the relative power of actors today or in the future. An 
actor that achieved its goal in a previous confrontation might not do so in a future 
confrontation.15  
Instead, Organski argues it would be more useful to look at what he called the 
determinants of power, the capabilities and resources that afford an actor the ability to 
influence the behavior of others in order to predict current and future power. Organski makes 
clear that it is impossible to measure state power with precise accuracy, and that power may 
not necessarily mean an actor achieves its desired outcomes. However, by looking at the 
determinants of power we can get an approximation of the power of an actor, and can then 
make a prediction about the outcomes of future disputes.  
            Before he discusses the determinants of power, Organski dedicates a section to the ways 
in which power can be used to change the behavior of another actor. I am including this 
because looking at material capabilities tell us nothing unless we put into context of how those 
resources can be used by an actor. There are four ways in which an actor can try and influence 
the behavior of another actor, i.e. exerting power over another. These are usually persuasion, 
rewards, punishments, and/or force.16 When an actor seeks to persuade another, it can try and 
                                                          
14 Ibid, 120. 
15 Organski, World Politics, 120. 
16 Ibid, 112. 
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reframe an issue in a way that makes another actor reconsider its own preferences. This may be 
done by appealing to the other actor’s sense of morality or by convincing it that a certain action 
is in its interest.17 An actor can offer rewards to another actor such as favorable trade benefits 
or material payoffs.18 Punishments would include policies such as trade embargos and 
economic sanctions, actions that are detrimental to the other, but are not meant involve 
violence.19 The use of force is the application of military action meant to compel an actor to 
change its behavior. The U.S. intervention into Kuwait was an example of the use of force 
meant to change the behavior of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq by what Thomas Schelling calls 
“compellance.”2021  
            Organski’s determinants of power are divided into two categories, natural and social 
determinants of power. Natural determinants include geography, natural resources, and 
population. Geography refers to the amount of territory controlled by an actor, its climate, its 
topography, and its location. Natural resources provide an actor the ability to develop a robust 
and diverse economy and maintain a modern military establishment.22 In his explanation of the 
importance of natural resources, Organski identifies minerals and fuels such as iron and coal, 
along with agricultural products as being among the most important resources. He also makes 
an important distinction that many others do not, that is, he identifies a difference between 
possession of a natural resource and the use of a resource. An actor that leads in the production 
of a natural resource may not be very powerful. Venezuela, for example, is a leading producer 
                                                          
17 Organski, World Politics, 112. 
18 Ibid, 113. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid,.114. 
21 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University, 2008), 70. 
22 Organski, World Politics, 138. 
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of petroleum, and yet it is not considered to be powerful. How efficiently a resource is used 
may give us a better approximation of power.23 The third natural determinant of power is the 
population of a state. Population is the most important determinant of national power 
according to Organski, since a large population translates to a large labor force and potential 
pool for conscripts.24  
Social determinants include economic development, political development (efficiency), 
and national morale. A state that possesses vast natural resources does not have power if it 
cannot convert those resources into high levels of military and economic capability. Political 
development means having government which is able to employ manpower and resources 
efficiently and develop their economy by investing in profitable and productive industries and 
skilled labor They have large bureaucracies that are able to put policy into action and use a 
state’s resources to affect domestic and foreign actors. Morale refers to the willingness of a 
population to put the collective interest above their own, or to adopt it as their own interest.25 
One the most influential authors on the issue of power in recent years is Joseph S. Nye 
who, like Organski, defines power as the ability of an actor to affect the behavior of others to 
achieve its goals.26 Nye’s conceptualization of power, however, goes beyond the widely used 
definition based on the means of reward and coercion. Rather than focusing on economic and 
military measures, Nye divides power into two separate categories, hard power and soft power. 
Hard power refers to the traditional metrics of power, economic and military capabilities. Soft 
                                                          
23 Organski, World Politics, 106. 
24 Ibid, 144. 
25 Ibid, 184. 
26 Joseph Nye. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power.” Foreign Affairs 88, no.4 (August 2009): 160. 
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power looks at often in-tangible elements of national power that change the preferences of 
actors such as education or popular culture. They can also be described as coercive and co-
optive powers. Hard power, the power of reward or coercion, can change the behavior of other 
actors by promising benefits or punishments. Co-optive power, or soft power, refers to the 
ability of a state to shape the preferences of others through the attractiveness of an actor’s 
culture or values.27  
 Nye argues that neither hard nor soft power is more important than the other in 
achieving goals. Rather, he argues that each situation requires a combination of both. To 
counter the misconception that soft power or hard power could accomplish policy goals on 
their own, Nye came up with the concept of “smart power,” a perfect combination of hard and 
soft power to achieve a goal. Every situation requires a different smart power strategy involving 
different applications of hard and soft power.28  
 Nye’s conceptualization of soft power is similar to Antonio Gramsci’s earlier conception 
of hegemony, that is, what is required to achieve hegemony. As I will explain later, Gramsci 
argues that a key requirement for hegemony is convincing others that your preferences are 
synonymous with their own. This would seem to indicate that soft power primacy is a necessary 
precondition for hegemony in the Gramscian sense. Nye argues that effective soft power can 
have the effect of changing the interests and motivations of other actors to become closer 
reflections of those of the dominant state.29 
                                                          
27 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 7. 
28 Nye, “Get Smart,” 160-161. 
29 Nye, Soft Power, 6. 
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 Realist and neorealist conceptualizations of hegemony almost universally accept the 
notion that hegemony is established by a state, which has a preponderance of power resources 
and capabilities. Realists are not alone in this view. The importance of power in hegemonic 
theory is echoed by liberal and Marxist theorists as well. However, the most powerful actor in a 
global system do not always establish a hegemonic order. For much of history the actor which 
dominated the balance of power has sought to establish more belligerent regimes in which 
their power is used to control directly the fate of others through coercion. This distinction 
between hegemony and empire has been emphasized by numerous scholars and theorists and 
will be expanded in what follows.  
Hegemony 
Attempts to define and operationalize hegemony, like the concept of power, has been 
debated and discussed at length by scholars. What does it mean to be a hegemon? How does a 
state establish hegemony? How do the other actors respond to the presence of a hegemonic 
power? Answering these questions can help an actor navigate in a world where a superpower 
dominates the global system. In this section, I will explore literature concerning the origins of 
hegemony as a concept and give a brief explanation of the major developments and iterations 
of the theory.  
 The term hegemony is derived from the Greek word ἡγέομαι, transliterated as 
hégeomai, meaning leader, ruler, leadership, and commander.30 It was originally used to refer 
to the personal leader of a military alliance, and then was later used to describe the leadership 
                                                          
30 Smith, Power in the Changing Global Order, 29. 
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of a particular monarch, more specifically that of 4th century Macedonia.31 More generally it 
referred to the dominance of a state, social group, or even an individual had over others. It was 
used by historian Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War to describe the leadership 
of Athens and Sparta of their respective alliances. The emphasis on leadership means that 
hegemonic power was seen as distinctly different from actors that are simply more powerful 
than their neighbors. South Africa for example is stronger economically and militarily than its 
neighbors, but it is not considered to be a hegemonic power.32  
From the time of the Greek historians and philosophers to the present, the meaning of 
hegemony has evolved and has eventually come to mean the simple domination by any one 
actor over others. This is interesting considering the emphasis placed on discerning between 
domination and hegemony by the ancient Greeks. It was not until the end of the 19th century 
and the beginning of the 20th that the concept of hegemony would have a major revival.  
Arguably one of the most influential theorists whose work on social hegemony changed 
the way in which observers thought about the concept was Antonio Gramsci. Born in 1891, 
Gramsci became a prominent Marxist intellectual and helped lead the movement in Italy. 
However, with ascent of fascism Gramsci was arrested and imprisoned along with other 
Marxists and intellectuals. While in prison he wrote a series of essays that have come to be 
known as the Prison Notebooks.33  
                                                          
31 George Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987), 17. 
32 Benedetto Fontana, “State and Society: The Concept of Hegemony in Gramsci,” In Hegemony and Power: 
Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, ed. Mark Haugaard and Howard H. Lentner. (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2006), 25 
33 David Forcacs, An Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935 (New York: Schoken Books, 1988), 23.  
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 In these writings, he discussed hegemony in the context of the supremacy of one 
socioeconomic class over other classes in a social system. The bourgeoisie presided over the 
social system in most states as a social hegemon. Gramsci moved away from the traditionally 
Marxist view that leadership and supremacy came only with control of the economy and more 
specifically the means of production. Instead, Gramsci focused more on the role of politics, civil 
society, and existence of dominant/subaltern relationships.34 The social hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie stemmed from the ability to make other classes consent to its leadership by 
presenting its own interests and ideas as also being the interests of other classes. They did this 
through the dissemination of unifying ideas and thoughts spread by intellectuals and 
propaganda, a task made easier by the fact that the bourgeoisie enjoyed control of the press, 
universities, and religious institutions. By accepting these ideas, other classes conflated their 
own interests with those of the bourgeoise, thereby consenting to their own oppression.35  
 Gramsci proposed that the working class form a counter-hegemonic strategy in which 
the more numerous proletariat would rise up and become the new hegemonic social class. In 
this counter-hegemonic strategy, the proletariat would renounce the interests of the 
bourgeoisie and instead argue that their interests were in fact the in the interest of the majority 
and thus of the other social classes. Accepting this, other classes would consent to the social 
leadership of the proletariat and reject the supremacy of the minority bourgeoisie.36  
 Aside from Marxists, prominent contributions to the discussion of hegemony and global 
politics emerge from the neorealist school of international relations theory. Hegemonic stability 
                                                          
34 Robert Bocock, Hegemony (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1986), 34-35. 
35 Bocock, Hegemony, 37. 
36 Fontana, “State and Society: The Concept of Hegemony in Gramsci,” 40-41. 
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theory has been seen by some observers to be the gold standard for examining the relationship 
between a hegemonic power and the global system. The theory is also used to help explain the 
growth of international regimes and the trigger for hegemonic wars. The theory is most 
commonly attributed to Charles Kindleburger and was first dubbed hegemonic stability theory 
by Robert Keohane.3738 Robert Gilpin is also regarded as a significant contributor to hegemonic 
stability theory with his discussion of hegemonic wars. 
 In Political Economy of International Relations, Robert Gilpin explains the basic 
assumptions of hegemonic stability theory (HST). According to HST, a strong and benevolent 
hegemonic state is necessary for the creation of stable international regimes. When a 
hegemonic power begins to decline, it may foretell a decline and collapse of that international 
regime. The theory posits that a liberal international economic order would be unable to 
flourish without the presence of a powerful hegemon to maintain and support that system.39 If 
the hegemon does not commit itself to maintain a liberal international order, it may seek a 
more imperial system in which it seeks to maintain its preeminence through the domination of 
other actors. Gilpin identifies the Soviet Union as a state that had the capacity to become a 
hegemonic power, but which pursued a foreign policy of imperial dominance over its 
satellites.40  
 Gilpin argues that hegemonic stability theory has its origins in Thucydides’ History of the 
Peloponnesian War. Thucydides was careful to distinguish the war between the Hellenic powers 
                                                          
37 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 72. 
38 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 12. 
39 Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, 72. 
40 Ibid. 
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from other wars because it was the result of a change in the distribution of power in the 
international system, specifically, the growth of Athens’s economy and navy.41 The distribution 
of power among actors is a key element in hegemonic stability theory, as well as Organski’s 
power transition theory and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.   
 Gilpin took hegemonic stability theory further with the development of his idea of 
hegemonic war. In his 1988 article “The Theory of Hegemonic War,” Gilpin examined the 
argument and methodology of Thucydides in his explanation of the events leading up to and 
following the Peloponnesian war. Gilpin argues is that the war described by Thucydides was a 
uniquely different conflict than other great power wars. Hegemonic wars, as he described 
them, were conflicts from which the victor would establish a new hegemonic order.42 The 
process occurred when, in a hierarchical system dominated by a hegemonic actor, a challenger 
rose in power faster relative to the dominant actor. The international system would divide into 
a structure of bipolarity in which the dominant actor and its challenger and their respective 
allies would oppose each other until a spark ignited a war between the hegemon and its 
challenger. The victor of the war would then become the new hegemon and would establish a 
new international order based on its political, economic, and security interests.43 
 Hegemonic stability theory has been criticized as placing too much emphasis on the 
need of a dominant hegemon for the continuity and health of a liberal economic order. In After 
Hegemony, Robert Keohane argued that while a hegemon is necessary for the development of 
a hegemonic regime, the decline of a hegemonic state does not necessarily mean the global 
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order it had established would fall. Rather, global institutions and multilateral cooperation 
could maintain the existing system well beyond the decline and absence of the hegemon.44  
 Gilpin’s theory of hegemonic war has also been criticized. One of the criticisms of the 
idea hegemonic war involves nuclear weapons. Gilpin himself brings this issue up in his article, 
claiming that “It is highly doubtful that a war between two nuclear powers could be limited and 
escalation intro a full-scale war prevented. Nor is it likely that either protagonist could escape 
the terrible devastation of such a great war or find the consequences in any sense 
acceptable.”45 The criticism is that a potential modern hegemonic war would likely involve 
nuclear weapons and end up being so costly that such a war would become less likely.  
Other theorists have tried to explain historical hegemonic relationships and power 
distributions. Long-cycle theory was primarily the product of George Modeleski and was 
influenced by the arguments of Organski and power transition theory. In Long Cycles in World 
Politics, Modeleski describes the international system in terms of a repetitive cycle of ascent 
and descent of a dominant power, major wars, and changes in international leadership. 
According to Modeleski, scholars in international relations must take into account all of history 
in order to explain phenomena, not just recent events. Modeleski argues that international 
relations and power diffusion are cyclical events within what he called the “global polity.”46 The 
global polity is the network of interactions that comprises the relationship between the leading 
power and any contenders. The global polity encompasses two separate actions, politicking and 
policy. Politicking entails competition for the position of leadership within a system; policy is 
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the agenda and goals set by the leader of the system. The most influential actors in the global 
polity are the global powers, whose patterns of interaction structure the global polity.47  
 According to long cycle theory, the international system goes through several phases. 
The first is a global war owing to global order having been replaced with global disorder. Phase 
2 occurs when a world power has emerged from phase 1 and establishes order under its 
leadership. Phase 3 is characterized by an erosion of the demand for leadership and security, 
resulting in a delegitimization of the leading power’s role. Phase 4 is described as 
“deconcentrating,” where disorder begins to spread as the world power’s leadership is no 
longer required, which in turn leads back to phase 1 and global war.48   
In his explanation Modeleski states that explanations of hegemony and international 
relations that focus on the “aspects of supply side leadership” are conceptually flawed. He 
specifies that Immanuel Wallerstein’s conception of hegemony as having preeminence in the 
production of agro-industrial and military power failed to take into account the demands of 
leadership that hegemons have to face in the world system.49  
 Influenced by Marx, Wallerstein’s approach to studying international relations breaks 
with the traditional view of the sovereign state as the unit of analysis, but instead looks at the 
“world system.” The world system he argues is comprised of smaller political subsystems, 
economic systems, and imperial systems. The current world system as he describes it is the 
capitalist world economy. This system is a large geographic zone within which there is a division 
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of labor and significant internal exchange of basic or essential goods as well as flows of capital 
and labor. 
 In world systems theory, a hegemonic state plays a similar role to the one described in 
hegemonic stability theory. The hegemon is an actor that has the capacity to create a system 
based on its political, economic, and security preferences. As Immanuel Wallerstein describes: 
“…for a certain period they were able to establish the rules of the game in the interstate 
system, to dominate the world-economy (in production, commerce, and finance), to get 
their way politically with minimal use of military force (which however they had in 
goodly strength), and to formulate the cultural language with which one discussed the 
world.”50   
 
According to Wallerstein, only three states have ever been able to establish hegemony, these 
include the United Provinces of the Netherlands in the 17th century, Great Britain in the middle 
of the 18th century, and the United States in the 20th century.  
 To Wallerstein, hegemony means having a comparative advantage in the most 
profitable modes of production. The state that is able to capture a largest share of the “core” 
and “periphery” divisions of labor is considered to have attained hegemony. The “core” refers 
to actors which have a strong means of production, while the “periphery refers to actors with a 
weak means of production.51 From its economic advantage, a hegemonic state can foster 
political influence and project military power.52 Wallerstein breaks hegemony down into three 
stages. First, a state experiences success in the production of profitable consumer goods, for 
example the monopoly enjoyed by England in textile production in the early stages of 
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industrialization. Second is success in the mass production of what Wallerstein calls capital 
goods. The third stage of hegemony is success in the financial sector and in foreign investments 
thanks to the hegemon’s central place in the global economy and world-system.53  
 Another influential contribution to the hegemony literature came from A.F.K. Organski 
and his development of power transition theory (PTT), which explores the impact of changes in 
the distribution of actor capabilities on the global system. According to power transition theory, 
“Power, then, is the ability to influence the behavior of others in accordance with one’s own 
ends”54 Organski argues that the only way to identify a state’s power relative to others is in 
hindsight. However, as stated earlier, he believes this does little to show us the current power 
hierarchy. Instead, he proposes looking at the resources of each actor relative to the others to 
estimate the current distribution of power. The differences in this distribution determines the 
structure of the international system and the way in which actors interact with one another.55  
The global structure is a key concept in power transition theory. Like other neorealist 
theories, PTT suggests that the structure of the system has a great deal of influence on relations 
between actors. The most powerful state is considered the dominant state, and the relationship 
between this actor and the other members of the global system can change the latter’s 
structure. Structure in this case is referring to the relationships between actors and the 
distribution of capabilities. Beneath the dominant power are the great powers, states which 
poses significant power and may be the dominant states in their regions, but which cannot yet 
challenge the position of the dominant state. Next come the middle powers followed by the 
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small powers. These states are continuing to industrialize and find that they generally benefit 
from the status quo.56 At the bottom of the pyramid are the dependent states which oppose 
the power structure, but have no way of changing it. 
 The way power transition theory works is that states are said to undergo a transition 
from pre-industrialized societies to fully industrialized ones. Said industrialization results in 
radical increases in state power beyond on the basic determinants of power such as territory 
and population. The three stages of this transformation are (1) potential power, (2) transitional 
growth in power, and (3) power maturity.57 Organski argues that the world is experiencing the 
second stage of power transition because, while most countries have industrialized, there are 
many that remain pre-industrialized. Once the industrial playing field is level and the world 
enters the third stage, new major powers will emerge, and new theories will be required.58 
Because states have not industrialized at the same time or the same rate, power has been 
unevenly distributed among them. When states go through industrialization, they have a 
“sprint” of power growth. This sprint allows some to challenge the dominant actor in the 
system and seek to assume the mantle for themselves.  
 The current stage of the power transition cycle has been greatly impacted by two major 
factors. First, there have been major shifts in the distribution of power. With actors at varying 
stages of industrialization and populations continuing to migrate, power has shifted across the 
spectrum and the position of dominant power has been occupied by several different actors. 
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These shifts in power are the primary causes of what Gilpin would describe as the hegemonic 
wars of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries.59   
 The second major characteristic of the second stage is that of an international order. 
With industrialization has come closer economic and diplomatic interdependence among 
states. Transnational companies now access resources in foreign countries that were previously 
unobtainable by their state, and which accelerate faster economic growth. Military ties have 
also been altered owing to the changing nature of industrialized warfare. Powerful European 
nations such as the United Kingdom, which had previously been the system’s dominant power, 
have heavily relied on the United States for protection.60 
 According to Organski, major wars occur when the dominant power in a system is 
challenged by a dissatisfied great power whose relative level of power is catching up to that of 
the dominant state.  It is again important to point out that the concept of power in power 
transition theory is a relative term. A state by itself cannot be considered powerful, weak, or 
dominant by looking at its capabilities alone. Power can only be judged when comparing it to 
that of another actor. With this in mind, the level of power for a rising great power to be 
considered a challenger to the dominant power is said by Tammen et al. to be a level relative to 
eighty percent of the dominant state’s power.61  
 Hegemony, or the presence of a dominant state, has major consequences for the global 
system by facilitating the safest international environment because a single power has the 
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capability to maintain peace and order. By using its power to reward, compel, or punish other 
members of a system, the hegemon prevents instability and conflict. The unipolar structure, 
according to power transition theory, is the most stable structural condition of the global 
system.  
However, another prominent realist gainsays this argument, John Mearsheimer, who 
believes that bipolarity is the most stable structure.62  While explaining his theory behind 
offensive realism, Mearsheimer argued that all states seek to maximize their power relative to 
one another with the eventual goal of becoming the hegemon. A hegemon he argues is a “great 
power with so much actual military capability and so much potential power that it stands a 
good chance of dominating and controlling all other great powers in its region of the world.”63 
However, Mearsheimer argues that no state has ever managed to become so dominant as to be 
considered a global hegemon. Rather, he contends that the most powerful states in history, 
including the contemporary United States, have only managed to become regional hegemons. 
Regional hegemons are different from global ones in that they are unable to dominate great 
powers outside of their region. Brazil, for example, would be considered a regional hegemon in 
South America.64 
 Mearsheimer has been criticized for his emphasis on military capability and the role of 
conflict in his view of international relations. It has been argued that power and the global 
system are complex than the simplified belief that international relations hinges on fear and 
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conflict.65 His contention that it is impossible for a state to become a global hegemon has also 
been called into question.66 While it is true that a state like Germany or China could not invade 
North America, the United States could potentially invade any country thanks to its ability to 
project power.  
Domination vs Leadership 
An interesting and reoccurring distinction that emerged from the literature was that 
between hegemony and imperialism. Hegemony, Snyder contends, is distinct from imperialism 
in which a dominant state simply imposes its will on the lesser states.67 Hegemony by contrast 
hinged on the hegemon being able to lead the other states in the system. This leadership 
implied that the other states consented to the hegemon assuming a position of leadership, in 
usually because it provided them with public goods in the form of economic or security 
benefits.  
Gramsci was clear in making a distinction between domination and leadership when 
describing his theories of social hegemony. As we have seen, Gramsci contended that in order 
to attain hegemony it was not enough to simply control the means of coercion or production. A 
class also had to get the consent and support of the other subgroups. To do this they needed 
these other groups to see the dominant class’s interests as their own, and thus giving it consent 
to lead. This requirement of consent meant that Gramsci believed that hegemony meant a form 
of leadership, not just coercive domination.68  
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George Modeleski in his book describing long cycle theory also identified hegemony as a 
form of leadership. After describing hegemony as distinct from domination, he chose to refer to 
hegemony as leadership for the remainder of his book.69 Mearsheimer, however, regards the 
two as synonymous, “Hegemony means domination of the system, which is usually interpreted 
to mean the entire world.”70 
This distinction has important implications for the formation of American foreign policy 
and grand strategy. The United States has traditionally claimed the moral high road, asserting 
that it does not coerce other countries to do its bidding. Because consent is a key component 
hegemony, the U.S. must be careful not to become overly aggressive when trying to achieve its 
goals. 
Past Hegemons 
 A common method for studying hegemony has been to review past examples of states 
that became hegemonic powers. However, there is debate about which past states should be 
considered hegemons or just powerful empires. Christopher Chase-Dunn has argued that only 
three actors could be considered hegemons since the beginning of the modern world-system; 
the United Provinces in 17th century, the United Kingdom in mid-18th Century, and the United 
States in mid-20th century.71 Authors like John Mearsheimer argue that no state has ever 
achieved global hegemony, but that a few have achieved regional hegemony only.72   
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U.S. Hegemony 
American hegemony, or at least the pursuit of it, is not new. The Monroe Doctrine 
effectively declared the Western hemisphere to be the territory of the United States and was 
meant to establish the U.S. as a regional hegemon by threatening European powers against 
further western colonization. Even during the years in which isolationism was the prevailing 
policy, the United States sought to increase its power through imperial economic policies and 
territorial expansion such as the annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines, and of Cuba. It is widely 
agreed that American hegemony began in some form after the Second World War. At the end 
of the war, the industrialized nations of Europe were in ruins. Entire cities were flattened, and 
millions of people lost their lives. Six years of devastating war resulted in the industries and 
economies of the great powers of Western Europe to be laid to waste. The Soviet Union and 
the nations of Eastern Europe faced similar physical devastation and suffered millions of 
casualties with additional millions displaced. It would take years and billions of dollars for 
Europe to rebuild.73  
 By contrast, the United States emerged from the Second World War more powerful 
than it had ever been. Shielded from the devastating conflict by its geographic location 
between two oceans, the United States was spared becoming a battleground during the war. 
With the exception of the attacks on the Aleutians and Pearl Harbor, the United States military 
infrastructure and industry suffered little damage or as a result of the conflict. Instead, a vast 
manufacturing giant had emerged with a thriving financial sector that allowed the it to fund the 
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reconstruction of Europe with the Marshall Plan. Factories that had previously produced 
weapons and equipment for the war effort began to produce steel, cars, and consumer goods.74 
 The countries of Western Europe were willing to allow the United States to assume a 
leadership role following the war as they needed American aid to rebuild and protection then 
from the threat of Soviet expansion. U.S. power helped increase European security and achieve 
regional recovery.75 This new leadership role allowed the United States to establish a sort of 
new world order, setting up numerous international and supranational institutions that would 
afford the United States major influence in the global conduct of international relations. The 
establishment of the United Nations as a successor to the League of Nations gave the United 
States considerable influence in establishing global norms and practices. Economic institutions 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund allowed the United States to 
establish global economic and financial norms and practices. NATO became a military alliance 
centered on the United States power. The economic and military preeminence of the U.S. 
meant that it almost immediately took the role of leader of the postwar Western world.  
 Others have argued that the United States achieved hegemony in the latter half of the 
century. In 1991 the global balance of power was shaken up with the geopolitical equivalence 
of a 9.0 earthquake. The Soviet Union, which for nearly five decades had balanced against the 
United States, collapsed. The fall of the Soviet Union meant that the United States was peerless 
in the global balance of power. In the unipolar years following the Cold War, the United States 
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had achieved global hegemony, notwithstanding Mearsheimer’s criteria that no actor has ever 
been able to achieve a level of global hegemony.76 
Others have argued that American hegemony is not in jeopardy at present because it 
was not a hegemon to begin with. Ian Clark argues that hegemony is not a matter of material 
dominance, but of perceptions of a state as a legitimate leader of an international society. 
According to his interpretation of social theories of hegemony, America has not had the 
consent and approval of the other states in the system and thus has not been a hegemon.77 
 American hegemony has been viewed as declining at several times since its rise to 
preeminence in the postwar world including the perceived missile gap in the 1960s and the 
controversial outcome of the Vietnam War in the 1970s.  During the 1980s, rapid growth in the 
Japanese economy again raised speculation that the United States was in decline. However, all 
of these predictions proved to be largely exaggerated. The most recent claim of American 
decline stems from the 2007-2009 financial crisis.78 A combination of slow economic recovery, a 
resurgent and aggressive Russia, the rise of global instability, and an increasingly assertive 
China, led to a new wave of declinists claiming that the global balance of power has shifted 
away from the American centered model.  
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Liberal Hegemonic Order 
The creation of a new world order by a state with predominant capabilities is an idea 
shared by hegemonic stability theorists, long cycle theorists, and power transition theorists.79 In 
the Years following World War 2, the United States established such an order with the signing 
of the Brenton Woods Agreements and the establishment of the International Monetary Fund, 
World Bank, General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and the United Nations.80 In the 1990s 
the World Trade Organization was established to act as a supranational institution to replace 
the GATT meant to settle trade disputes and foster more liberal practices of international trade. 
If the United States has experienced a relative decline, then what should follow is a weakening 
of this liberal world order. In the worlds of Robert Gilpin “The hegemonic power is both able 
and willing to establish and maintain the norms and rules of a liberal economic order, and with 
its decline the liberal economic order is greatly weakened.”81  
Establishing and maintaining what John Ikenberry calls a “liberal international order,” 
sometimes referred to as the liberal hegemonic order, has been a central policy goal for the 
United States since the end of World War 2.82 The Establishment of GATT to facilitate trade 
openness and the Brenton Woods agreements’ goal of managing financial policy were key to 
this policy. In addition, the Marshal Plan sought to rebuild the economies that had been 
decimated by conflict by providing money in exchange for deregulation, lowering of trade 
barriers, and increased production. NATO was established to ensure peace and deter 
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aggression by the Soviet Union and any other aggressor threatening to upend the system. After 
the Cold War ended, American leaders sought to extend the liberal international order into 
previously unreachable territories.83 Evidence of this initiative include the expansion of NATO 
into Eastern Europe, admission of China into the World Trade Organization and the liberal 
economic policies imposed on them as conditions of admission, and the multiple attempts to 
replace authoritarian regimes in Africa and the Middle East with Western style democracies.  
 In a statement on February 19, 2017 the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called 
for the creation of a “post-West world order.” He also claimed that NATO, one of the hallmarks 
of American Western hegemony, was a relic of the Cold War.84 This desire for a new world 
order is shared by many who decry globalism and the liberal economic order established by the 
United States. The liberal world order is one of the cornerstones of American hegemony and is 
characterized by economic openness, promotion of human rights, democratization, and 
international relations governed by rule-based systems.85  
 Some scholars argue that the liberal world order will not erode because there is no 
liberal world order. According to Volgy, Grant, and Faussett, the United States failed to 
establish an international system of rules and norms because it lacked the structural strength to 
establish a new world order consistent with its policy preferences, despite its material 
predominance. More specifically, the authors argue that the United States had no clear policy 
preferences in the Cold War and that the United States was not strong enough in terms of 
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economic or military capacity to establish or maintain a new order globally over the long 
term.86  
 Other researchers have argued that even if the United States were to fall from its 
position of power preeminence, the liberal world order would remain unchanged. In his article 
The Future of the Liberal World Order, John Ikenberry argues that the liberal world order is here 
to stay because there is not a system ready to replace it, should the United States recede as the 
hegemonic state. He argues that China, the most likely challenger, has risen in power largely 
thanks to the international order and that it will seek to continue that order from a new 
position of authority.87  
Charles Kupchan counters this argument by claiming that the current absence of a 
replacement system does not guarantee that one could not be established with the rise of a 
new hegemonic power. All rising great powers will try and establish a new world order based 
on their own norms and preferences as the old order destabilizes.88 His research on the 
normative aspects of hegemony demonstrates that as the power gap between a hegemonic 
state and a rising challenger narrows, a competition between the two state’s norms and values 
ensues.89 
Challengers 
 While the specific arguments of the literature differ from source to source, one of the 
few areas where most research converge is the perception of China as being the most likely 
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contender to replace the United States as the hegemonic power. Years of double digit 
economic growth and rapid advancement in military modernization has led many to believe 
that China is destined to reassume its historical position as the most powerful country in the 
world.90  
 Arguments have also been made that a challenge could come from a familiar adversary. 
In the past three years Russia has emerged as a regional power determined to regain its Cold 
War position of power and influence. They’re hindered by an economy dependent on oil and 
natural gas and their government is rampant with fraud and corruption.91 Their military 
intervention into Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean Peninsula sent shockwaves through 
the world and caused many in the media and politics to wonder if we are on the verge of a new 
Cold War. While Russia does not approach the capabilities that the United States possesses, or 
even the former Soviet Union, they have successfully used their economic and military power 
to achieve several key foreign policy goals.92  
 Another potential hegemonic power in the making commonly mentioned is Europe. 
While not a single state, a Europe that could unify into a single geopolitical body would be an 
easy match for American preeminence; in some areas a European superpower would even 
surpass the United States. The concept of a united Europe is not a new phenomenon; following 
World War 2 there was a prominent call for a unified European polity in order to avoid a future 
conflict. Winston Churchill referred to this idea of a European superpower as the “United States 
of Europe.” While a European super-state would match the United States’ power in multiple 
                                                          
90 Joseph Nye, Is the American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), 48. 
91 Ibid, 33-34. 
92 Ibid 36-38. 
34 
 
 
categories, the reality is that Churchill’s USE is far from becoming a reality, and is indeed moved 
further from the realm of possibility in recent years.93 The exit of Great Britain from the 
European Union and prevailing issues such as economic slowdown and the rising popularity of 
nationalism have largely removed Europe from the minds of many as a challenger in the near 
future.  
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY 
Theoretical Framework 
As my literature review demonstrates, there are numerous ways to approach the 
concept of hegemony. However, hegemonic stability theory most accurately applies to the 
current world system. To briefly reiterate, the theory of hegemonic stability contends that the 
existence of a single powerful state will facilitate a peaceful global system and the 
establishment of a liberal economic order.94 The United States established a multi-regional 
hegemony in the western hemisphere as well as parts of Europe and Asia following World War 
II. As the hegemonic power, it established a liberal economic order within its sphere of 
influence, spurned the establishment of democratic governments in the place of formally fascist 
regimes, and ensured the safety and security of all actors within its sphere. Following the end of 
the Cold War, the United States expanded its sphere of influence and the liberal world order to 
regions previously under Soviet control. American hegemony is so pervasive in global politics 
that the term “the west” has come to refer to the United States rather than other western 
actors.  
Hegemonic stability theory (HST), contends that the decline of a hegemon would bring 
about the decline of the world order the hegemon had established.95 If the power gap between 
the United States and its challengers has begun to shrink, then the liberal world order which 
the U.S. seeks to maintain would erode away in favor of more anarchic power politics in which 
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actors seek to maximize their own power and new powerful states attempt to establish their 
own world order. 
My thesis utilized HST by arguing that the rise in power of potential challengers and the 
narrowing of the power gap between those challengers and the United States is caused decline 
of the liberal world order. The presence of what I will from here on refer to as a legitimate 
challenger will cause the world order established by the hegemon to erode as the hegemon is 
no longer able or willing to maintain it, and as the challenger seeks to establish its own order. 
When the power gap is larger, weaker states will be more inclined to work with the hegemon, 
or at least avoid working against it. But as the gap narrows, powerful actors may feel like taking 
advantage of their new position to increase their own influence and power. In some cases, such 
as Ukraine for example, this may come at a price to less powerful actors. If the hegemon is 
unable to respond to the actions of the challengers, then it would signal to the weaker states 
that they can no longer rely on the hegemony for physical protection, or for protection of the 
rules of the system. Similarly, it may drive some actors to “join sides” with the challenger.  
Hegemon 
My review of the existing literature has revealed that while the definitions and 
conceptualizations of hegemony are diverse, there are several key assumptions shared by most 
theories. First is the agreement that a hegemon is an actor who holds a significant material 
advantage over the other actors in the system.96 In order for a state to become a hegemon it 
must have the capability to provide benefits for those within its sphere of influence, and to 
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protect the international order which it establishes from potential challengers. More militaristic 
views of hegemony such as those of John Mearsheimer contend that a hegemon must have the 
ability to defeat any other actor within a system in an armed conflict.97 For an actor to have the 
ability to establish an international order and defend it from challengers would all but require 
that state to have predominance in power capabilities. A hegemon will use its predominance in 
capability to establish the rules of the international system in the form of institutions and 
norms based on the hegemons values and national interest through international institutions 
and the impression of policy preferences on weaker actors.98  
 A second shared idea is that there is an important distinction between a hegemonic and 
an imperial actor. “Today, ‘hegemony’ is often used to describe coercive and illegitimate forms 
of power. The original concept was, however, significantly different – and legitimacy was 
central to it.”99 It is argued that a hegemonic state is different from a powerful imperial state in 
that it does not dominate other states through oppression or direct control. Rather, a 
hegemonic state seeks to lead subordinate actors through the promise of protection and 
reward. A hegemon will assume responsibilities and costs from subordinate state, who in turn 
surrender some of their political autonomy. Much like the control of the elite over the 
proletariat described by Gramsci, the hegemon will try to make the weaker state in the system 
adopt its national interests as their own.100 While this distinction is seen as important by several 
scholars, as I discussed in my review of previous literature, there are circumstances in which a 
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world power may act belligerent, but may establish a hegemony in the wake of its conquest. 
Ancient Rome and colonial Great Britain are perfect examples of this scenario. 
 Taking into consideration these important distinctions and concepts, for the purpose of 
my thesis, I will define a hegemon as a state which possesses a predominance of power 
resources thus allowing it to underwrite the rules and norms of a global order with the consent 
of other actors, be that system regional or global. This definition would combine the material-
focused definitions of hegemony such as those used by John Mearsheimer with the social 
conceptualizations set forward by Antonio Gramsci, Ian Clark, and others. Additionally, this 
definition conforms with the central themes of hegemonic stability theory by fulfilling the 
requirements of the framework of the existence of a single powerful actor, which has the 
capability of establishing and maintaining a liberal hegemonic order.     
When authors refer to the decline of a hegemon, it is important to distinguish what 
exactly is meant by the phrase decline. Relative decline refers to a situation in which actor A is 
rising in power faster than actor B, and so the gap between actor B and actor A shrinks. While 
relative decline occurs when one actor is growing slower than the other, absolute decline 
occurs when an actor sees its power decrease in absolute terms independently from any other 
actor.101  
Power 
The concept of power is a central pillar to hegemonic stability theory as well as my 
definition of a hegemon. For my thesis, I define power as any person(s) or object(s) or 
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medium(s) that can contribute to the ability of an actor to change the behavior of another 
actor. My analysis will look at the two categories of power put forward by Joseph Nye, hard 
power and soft power. The distinction between hard power and soft power is an important 
one, especially when studying the concept of hegemony. The hegemon operates with the 
consent of the weaker actors in the system. This consent is largely derived from the perception 
that the hegemon is acting rightfully and that the interests of the weaker actors coincide with 
the interests of the hegemon. To achieve this level of consent and political influence, the 
hegemon needs more than just weapons and money; tools that would be more useful to an 
actor seeking to dominate its neighbors by force.   
Challenger 
The rise of another actor or the stagnation of the capabilities of an existing hegemon 
arouses an important question; at what point does a rising actor become something more than 
another member of the global community and begin the threaten the established hierarchy. 
There are surprisingly little answers to be had on this particular question. Most theories, 
including hegemonic stability theory, see the rise of a challenger culminate in a conflict for the 
position of hegemon. However, prior to the outbreak of a hegemonic war, there is sure to be 
friction between the existing hegemon and the potential challenger as the hegemon seeks to 
maintain its preeminence. Similarly, the rising challenger will seek to better its position and use 
its capabilities to establish its own sphere of influence.  
A challenger is more than just an actor that sees an increase in its capabilities. Power is 
constantly shifting each day as economies interact and global events unfold. In order to 
determine if the United States is indeed facing a challenge to its hegemony, there must be a 
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way to identify when an actor has reached a position in which it is able to challenge the 
hegemon’s authority. This would require the challenger to have the ability to resist attempts by 
the hegemon to punish the challenger and have the ability to establish and maintain a counter-
hegemonic order. In describing and the core elements of power transition theory, Ronald 
Tammen et. al. identified a threshold originally chosen by Organski equating to a relative level 
of eighty percent of the hegemon’s capabilities.102 To possess relative capabilities, equal to 
eighty percent of the hegemon, would allow a challenger to resist attempts by the hegemon to 
curb their rise. It would also allow for that actor to begin to establish a sphere of influence of its 
own, within its own region, with new rules and norms. 
Hegemonic Order. 
According to the theory of hegemonic stability theory, the dominance of a single 
hegemonic state is necessary for the establishment of a liberal economic world order. This 
world order would be maintained by the hegemon which would accept certain responsibilities 
and provide certain benefits to the weaker actors in the system. Those actors would consent to 
the hegemon’s leadership and surrender some political autonomy thus giving this world order 
legitimacy.103 Should the hegemon decline and a new state rise to challenge its preeminence, 
then the rising state will seek to change the status quo and establish its own hegemonic order 
based on its own rules and norms.104 Following a conflict in which a hegemon is replaced by the 
rising challenger as the dominant state in the system, a new world order is established.  
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Some authors have argued that a decline of a dominant power does not necessarily 
mean that the international order they established will destabilize. As stated in my literature 
review, one of the most widely cited authors to hold this view is John Ikenberry. He argues that 
rising powers, including potential challengers to a hegemon, have benefited from what he calls 
the “liberal hegemonic order,” and will seek to rise within it rather than replace it. This is 
commonly referred to as the “socialization” hypothesis; the notion that rising states will seek to 
cooperate within the system rather than supplant it with one of their own design.105 
I disagree with the socialization hypothesis for two reasons. First, while I agree that 
states seek to advance their national interests in terms of power, they may do so in different 
ways. A perfect example of this issue can be seen today with the rise of China and the potential 
challenge to the United States. The U.S. enjoys a free-market economic system and seeks to 
spread the ideals of democracy and freedom beyond its borders. China by contrast has a very 
state-centric economic structure and has been able to resist democratic change within its 
government for decades to the astonishment of political scientists and policy makers. To 
believe that a rising challenger such has China would adopt the position of leader of global 
political-economic order which contradicts its own policy preferences and domestic structure is 
a bridge too far. 
Furthermore, I argue that developing economies have already begun to lay the 
groundwork for new regional economic orders with the establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) by China and the creation of the New Development Bank 
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by the five BRICS nations. China has also constructed military instillations on several artificial 
islands allowing it to dominate valuable resource deposits and reach its military arm across 
several major sea trade routes in the region and has opened its first overseas military 
instillation in Djibouti.   
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research Design 
 Comparing cross national time series data on fifteen metrics of soft and hard power will 
allow me to observe any relative decline in U.S. power capabilities. By using the eighty percent 
threshold first identified by Organksi and later used by Tammen, I will be able to see if either 
China or Russia have crossed that line to be considered legitimate challengers in each power 
metric.106 If a state can be considered a legitimate challenger to American power in a majority 
of the chosen metrics, then that actor would be considered a hegemonic challenger rather than 
just rising great power. After an examination of the relative power capabilities of the hegemon 
and its potential challengers, I will then examine indicators representing three core tenets of 
the liberal world order which the United States established and maintained for decades to 
determine whether that order is beginning to erode as hegemonic stability theory predicts it 
would. 
Power Capabilities 
 After my review of the literature, I have found many efforts towards operationalization 
of power to include observations of only a few variables. Some authors feel it is sufficient to 
only look at single metric of economic strength of a country by examining GDP or GNP, while 
others focus solely on military capacity. Other authors create more inclusive measures of state 
power that incorporate economic, military, and political resources. In my data set I intend to 
include economic, military, political, cultural, and technological variables. I acknowledge that no 
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dataset can include every source of state power, but I hope to create one that will most 
accurately reflect the relative distribution of capabilities. 
Operationalizing power is an extremely complex task because nearly everything can 
provide a state with some measure of power. As Charles Schleicher describes it, “Of what is 
power composed? Almost all of the resources of a nation – men, machines, money, natural 
resources – enter into its power potential, although most of these can be used for cooperation 
as well as conflict.”107 The constant development of new technologies and the lightning fast 
pace of the modern global economy means that new elements of power are being created 
constantly. Information gathering necessary for conflict as well as bargaining, which formerly 
required a great deal of manpower, skill, and time can now be done from a laptop on the other 
side of the planet. Technology that was once commonly found in remote control children’s toys 
is now being used to guide high-tech military drones. Any measure of power will be incomplete 
or soon outdated, but this does not reduce the importance or usefulness of the concept. 
Observing an approximate distribution of power can help us to estimate which actor would be 
successful in a potential dispute. It can also help us to understand relationships of the 
international system and why actors react differently to one another.   
 
Hard Power 
 The variables I will include in my dataset will capture both of Nye’s concepts of hard and 
soft power state capabilities. For hard power capabilities, I will include GDP, population, 
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military spending, military manpower, number of active naval vessels, iron production, steel 
production, petroleum production, primary energy consumption, and research and 
development spending. While there are other resources that could be included, I believe these 
to be the most pertinent to this study.  
 A state cannot function efficiently without a stable economy that allows it to collect 
taxes, provide public goods, and fund its military. While not yet the most important 
determinant of state capabilities, it is nonetheless a vital element that must be taken into 
consideration when attempting to measure state power. In measuring a state’s economic 
wealth, some authors have chosen to use gross national product (GNP) since it includes the 
product of domestically based companies and persons working outside of the United States. 
John Mearsheimer used GNP since it provided a picture what he referred to as latent economic 
power; the “mobalizable” wealth of a state.108 Other authors have chosen to use gross 
domestic product (GDP) to determine economic power.109 For my thesis I will be using gross 
domestic product. Using GDP will allow for a more accurate measure of economic growth and 
production because it includes all production and business occurring in the United States and 
not just that which is done by U.S. citizens and companies. Wealth produced by Americans 
outside of the United States may not be useable in a time of crisis. It was for this reason that 
the United States Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis switched from using 
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GNP to using GDP in August of 1991.110 GDP data is published by the World Bank and is 
recorded in billions of dollars. 
Some authors have focused on the wealth of a state to act as a proxy for the overall 
power of a state. This can be an ineffective way to judge power for several reasons. First, not all 
wealthy nations are powerful; Qatar for example has a GDP (PPP) per capita more than twice 
that of the United States.111 Similarly, some poorer states may be able to achieve greater 
success in their goals than more powerful nations. North Vietnam for example had an economy 
that could not hope to compare to that of the United States, and yet they were able to wage an 
ultimately successful war against the U.S. and its South Vietnamese ally.  
 An actor’s industrial capacity is another important pillar of its power. Production of key 
resources allows a state to produce profitable goods, attract foreign investment, build a 
modern infrastructure, and maintain a strong military that can project power beyond its 
borders. While there are literally thousands of different individual products of industrialization 
that could be included in measuring an actor’s industrial capacity, I will be using four that I feel 
to be most useful. These include iron production, steel production, petroleum production, and 
energy consumption. Iron and steel are used in the construction of infrastructure projects, 
factories, industrial as well as consumer goods, and the manufacture of weapons and military 
systems. Data for iron and steel production will be drawn from United States Geological Survey 
and are recorded in millions of metric tons. 
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Petroleum is vital for electrical power, manufacture of goods, and fueling vehicles and 
aircraft. Without a steady production or import of oil economies can be incapacitated and 
militaries can be hamstrung. Need for oil can also drive an actor to adopt aggressive trade and 
foreign policies. A perfect example of this can be seen in history in the time leading up to, and 
before the conclusions of, World War 2. Japan lost its supply of oil when the United States cut it 
off, driving Japan to seek sources elsewhere and attack the U.S. Similarly, the German military 
found itself rendered vulnerable and impotent when its mechanized forces began running out 
of fuel. Data on fuel consumption is found in the databases of the Energy Information 
Administration, and is measured as the average barrels of oil produced in a single day in a given 
year. 
Primary energy consumption is a measure commonly used by economists to measure 
the total energy demand of an actor prior to that energy source being converted to usable 
energy. This allows us to see the total about of energy used, not just the amount burned. 
Higher levels of primary energy use reflect how developed and industrialized and economy is. 
Primary energy data is published by the Energy Information Administration and is measured in 
quadrillion BTU.  
 Arguably the most important resource for state power is the population of country. At 
the most basic level a large population will provide a large labor force and an ample 
recruitment pool for the military.112 A large population can also contribute to a larger skilled 
workforce, higher tax gross tax revenues, and provides a latent economic power that can be 
mobilized through effective economic development. Population is also one of the few variables 
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of national power that are not subject to sudden rapid change. Growth rates of a population 
can also provide a glimpse of the future potential power of developing states. Developed and 
industrialized states do not see a great deal of population expansion outside of mass 
immigration. Some developed economies such as Italy and Japan are even experiencing a 
decline in their populations. Developing countries on the other hand will see rapid population 
expansion as their fertility rates remain high. As these economies continue to develop and 
modernize and the average wealth per capita continues to rise, their growth rates will begin to 
decline. The United States, it is argued, cannot remain the preeminent power because it faces 
challenges from nations such as China and eventually India, both of which individually have 
populations four times larger than the United States. Data on population size is taken from the 
World Bank Database and is measured in individuals. 
 While interstate conflict had nearly vanished since the end of the Cold War, military 
power still allows a state to protect its national interest and deter aggression. A hegemonic 
power will be a state that has the ability to enforce the rules and protect the order it 
establishes. If a state cannot project military power, then it cannot maintain hegemony. 
Military spending will act as a proxy measure for the quality of a state’s military by 
demonstrating how much resources an actor dedicates to its armed forces. Military spending 
data is gathered every year by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPIRI) and 
is recorded in U.S. dollars. 
Military manpower will provide a measure for the approximate size of a military. 
Additional analysis of a state’s military, looking at the number of aircraft, armored vehicles, and 
missile systems a country possesses, could arguably provide a more detailed look at military 
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capacity. However, individual weapon systems and military programs are often designed for 
specific tasks and missions such as anti-terrorism operations or area specific deterrence. So, for 
the purpose of this thesis, I feel using military expenditures and manpower will provide a 
sufficient approximation of a state’s overall military capacity. Military personnel data is 
gathered from the World Bank Database and is measured in individuals. 
 One additional measurement used by George Modeleski and AFK Organski to judge 
military capability which I will also be using is naval strength.113 A large navy allows a state to 
project power beyond its borders, and even beyond its hemisphere. Naval power is necessary 
to allow a state to protect or cut trade routes, blockade foreign coastlines, and land invasion 
forces on foreign soil. A powerful state without a strong navy may become a regional hegemon, 
but it cannot become a global hegemonic power. Time series data on naval capacity is not 
available for China or Russia, and very little data could be found on the U.S. Due to this data 
limitation, I will be looking at data presented by Global Firepower on 2016 naval capacity.  
 My last variable that could well be considered both a contributor to hard power as well 
as soft power is in technological development. New technology such as the internet has 
allowed for revolutions in the way economies conduct business, scientific communities conduct 
research, and militaries carry out missions. New advancements in technology can have a 
profound effect on the ability of a state to project power abroad. The best example would be 
the Stuxnet virus. A malicious computer program was able to cause severe damage to an 
Iranian nuclear power facility, rendering it inoperable for some time. In 1981, the Israeli air 
force carried out airstrikes against an Iraqi nuclear reactor with the same intent. In the span of 
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a few decades, a task that was once conducted by fighter jets can now be done by computers 
and hackers. Government spending on research and development will provide a glimpse of how 
much resources an actor puts into developing the latest technology. Research and development 
spending data is published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
and is reported in millions of dollars. 
Soft Power 
 The soft power capabilities I am using in my research are just as important to state 
capability as hard power elements. Because my conceptualization of hegemony emphasizes the 
consent of weaker actors, the ability to attract a foreign state is equally important in 
establishing hegemony than the ability to dominate one.  
Soft power is a far more difficult concept to operationalize, and indeed includes 
intangibles that cannot be quantified. The basic premise of soft power is that it is the ability of 
an actor to achieve its desired goals through attraction rather than coercion. There are 
thousands of different sources of attraction and influence that could affect different countries 
in different ways. For example, investment into developmental assistance could be a greater 
source of soft power for a country that is dealing with developing states like South Sudan or 
Yemen, than it would be if that country was dealing with an industrialized state like Canada. 
Domestic issues such as capital punishment and gun control can have profound effects on 
American soft power in certain situations.114 In my thesis I will look at sources of soft power 
that contribute the most to the ability of an actor to affect the behavior of another.  
                                                          
114 Nye, Soft Power, 59. 
51 
 
 
 The quality of an actor’s universities can provide a state with a great deal of soft power 
and can lead to hard power advantages as well. Academic institutions and research universities 
can pioneer new scientific discoveries and technologies that can change the economic and 
social fabric of a society. Militaries depend on the skill and quality of universities and research 
laboratories to create the newest weapons systems and equipment to provide them with an 
edge over potential adversaries. During the nuclear arms race and the space race, the university 
and laboratory became a frontline for the Cold War. Universities are also where new ideas and 
ideologies are fostered and spread. Students from foreign countries can attend a university and 
receive an education and be exposed to the host country’s ideas and norms while bringing their 
own culture to that country. Some of these students will return home and find jobs in positions 
that will allow them to affect their country’s policies or national power.115  
 Because of the enormous soft power and potential hard power benefits that universities 
and education systems provide, I will include several variables that reflect their contributions. 
First, government investment into education will give me a measure of that actor’s efforts 
towards scientific progress, as well as its efforts to improve its available human capital. More 
investment will mean greater resources for educational institutions and will help to entice 
students from other countries to seek to study in that country. This will be reflected in my 
second measure which will be the number of students attending universities who originate 
from outside of that country. My third measurement will be the number of students graduating 
with a tertiary degree in a given year. A higher skilled workforce can lead to higher productivity 
and a stronger economy. Data on inbound international students is published by the World 
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Bank, and is recorded as individuals. Data on tertiary graduates is also published by the World 
Bank. Time series data on education spending was not available, and so government education 
spending for the year 2016 was found using three different sources which are listed in appendix 
one.  
   Investing in the economy of another country can be a great source for soft power. 
Investment in developing economies can foster positive relationships with local people, 
economic interdependence, and can help to grow a young economy. This can foster influence 
with other countries and goodwill with the populations of recipient nations. To measure foreign 
investment, I observed foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks. These included the net total of all 
FDI at a set point in time. FDI stock data was found at Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development database and is recorded in millions of U.S. dollars. 
 In 2016 the action movie Captain America: Civil War earned more than $1.1 billion from 
domestic and international showings. One year earlier, Michael Jackson’s hit album Thriller 
went Platinum for the 30th time, adding to its success as the number one most sold album 
globally with more than 100 million copies sold.  Opinions on the importance of popular culture 
to a state are at best mixed. Some argue that popular culture is a detriment to the image of the 
United States, spreading the perception that Americans are overly materialistic and frivolous. 
However, others argue that popular culture can overtly or subliminally spread a country’s 
values and ideals. The popularity of a country’s music, film, and even sporting events can have a 
profound impact on the opinions of other states. The spread of iconic brands like McDonalds 
and Coca-Cola are seen as spreading American culture and influence. During the Cold War, 
popular music encouraged sentiments of nonconformity, while films spread the idea that 
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individuals could own their own home or car thanks to capitalism. While the question of what 
exactly can be considered popular culture is highly debatable, it is generally accepted that 
media such as music and film are considered to be products of a state’s popular culture.  So, to 
measure the impact of popular culture today I looked at the total value of the media and 
entertainment industry in the year 2016. Unfortunate, like education spending and naval 
capacity, time series data is not available. 
The first part of my cross-national analysis will look at my selected power metrics and 
determine if the United States has experienced a period of relative decline or absolute decline.  
And so: 
H1: The United States experienced a relative decline in a majority of the power metrics 
in which a decline was observed. 
 
I have identified earlier the threshold for a state to be considered a challenger for 
hegemony as having eighty percent of the relative power capabilities of the hegemon. Should a 
state achieve a level of national power capabilities equal to eighty percent of the hegemons’ 
power, then the international structure will be considered bipolar as that actor would have the 
ability to challenge the status quo of the system and balance against the hegemon. Because 
power is not a single metric, but a group of metrics, then a legitimate challenger to the 
hegemon will need to attain a relative level of power capability equal to eighty percent of the 
hegemon’s capability in a majority of the observed power metrics.  
H2: China has reached a threshold of 80% of national power capabilities relative to the 
United States in a majority of national power metrics.  
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 It can be argued that Russia seeks to establish itself as a potential challenger to the 
United States and to balance against the West. The conquest of the Crimean Peninsula and the 
military intervention in Syria on behalf of the Bashar Al-Assad regime stands as evidence to this. 
However, I do not believe that Russia has achieved a level of national power capabilities to be 
considered a legitimate challenger, and so: 
 
H3: Russia has not reached a threshold of 80% of national power capabilities relative to 
the United States in a majority of national power metrics.  
 
Liberal Hegemonic Order 
The final part of my analysis will look at the liberal international order which the United 
States has sought to maintain and expand. If the United States is declining as a hegemonic 
state, then we should see this international order begin to erode as the hegemon becomes 
unwilling or unable to continue maintaining it. From my research, I have been able to flesh out 
three distinct characteristics of the liberal hegemonic order; reduction of trade barriers, spread 
of liberal democracy, and the role of the United States as a security guarantor.  Trade 
liberalization has been a central point of American foreign policy for decades and was pushed 
heavily with programs such as the Washington consensus. The United States pushed for other 
countries to adopt the policies of the Washington Consensus which called for liberalization of 
trade policies and the minimization and removal of trade barriers.116 To see the effect of global 
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trade liberalization I will look at the total value of international trade as a percentage of global 
GDP, commonly referred to as the trade openness index. 
H4: The value of global international trade as a percent of GDP is declining.  
 
The second core characteristic of the liberal international order is the push for countries 
to democratize. During the Cold War the United States sought to prevent the spread of 
communism and promote the spread of democracy as part of its policy of containment. In the 
years after the Cold War the spreading of democracy around the world has been maintained as 
a mainstay of American foreign policy and has even accelerated in some circumstances thanks 
to less concern of Soviet interference.117  
 Using data collected and presented by Freedom House I will look at the current health 
of global democracies and the spread of democratic values. Using Freedom House indicators 
provides two benefits; first is the availability of data. Freedom House has collected and 
published its data every year beginning in 1972, allowing for an effective time series analysis. 
Second, the indicators used by Freedom House are sometimes criticized as only reflecting 
Wester liberal democratic values. Since I intend to analyze the western liberal hegemonic order, 
this actually provides normative validity to my choice of the Freedom House data.    
H5: Global democracy indicators are declining.  
 
 The spread of democracy has been a key pillar in American foreign policy since the early 
stages of the Cold War. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new push was made to 
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promote democratization and democratic values. The spread of democracy has also been seen 
as a major economic goal due to the perception of easier trade relations and commerce with 
other democracies.  
The rising powers which would have the potential to challenge American hegemony are 
not western style democracies. China continues to operate a state-centric political and 
economic system involving a politburo of political oligarchs, and Russia stands on the brink of 
dictatorship under Vladimir Putin. If the liberal hegemonic order is receding, then we should 
also see global democracy begin to erode. 
 The final cornerstone of the liberal hegemonic order is the guarantee of security and 
protection by the United States. As the only remaining military superpower following the Soviet 
Union’s collapse in 1990, the United States enjoyed a level of military dominance never before 
seen. With this military predominance, the United States has sought to limit armed conflict and 
enforce its world order through military intervention in Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, and others. If the 
United States is declining and is no longer able or willing to enforce the rules of the 
international system, then we should see a decline in this security guarantee: 
H6: United States foreign security aid is declining. 
 
In order to observe the United States position as the global security guarantor, I chose to 
look at the amount in security aid the U.S. provides each year. This data was published by 
Security Assistance Monitor, a program run by the Center for International Policy, and is 
gathered by reviewing Congressional Budget Justification reports, State Department reports, 
along with individual program reports. This aid comes in the form of training, financial aid, or 
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materials to foreign security police forces.  I chose to use security aid because it demonstrates 
U.S. willingness and effort to aid our allies and partners without large troop deployments which 
could become expensive or unpopular. Security aid on the other hand can be provided more 
frequently and aims to provide longer term protection in the form of better local forces rather 
than temporary American defensive garrison.  
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CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS 
Data Limitations 
 While collecting my data I found metrics in which time series data does not exist. Among 
the missing data was information on naval capacity, education spending, and revenues of the 
media and entertainment industries. Additionally, my intent was to begin my analysis of each 
power metric by looking at time series data starting in 1991 with the ending of the Soviet Union 
and the establishment of the U.S. as the sole superpower. In the time series I was able to 
conduct, I have used data beginning at or as close to 1991 as possible. Most of the series do 
start at 1991, I was forced to start others within a few years later. While those series do not 
start at 1991, they do demonstrate the changes that have occurred in the distribution of power.  
Hard Power 
The United States continues to maintain the largest gross domestic product in the world 
valued at more than eighteen trillion dollars as of 2015. A visible drop is seen in the time series 
data in 2008-2009 following the collapse of the housing market and the subsequent banking 
crisis. By applying a polynomial line of fit to the data it can be seen that both the U.S. as well as 
China are forecasted to continue positive GDP growth based on current trends. It can also be 
seen by extending the line of fit out by a decade, that China’s GDP is could surpass that of the 
U.S. if current trends persist. The R2 values of both lines are presented in the graph and indicate 
a strong fit to the data. 
GDP growth in China has slowed down in recent years as the country tries to modernize 
and diversify its economy. It has been argued that as the manufacturing giant’s economy 
continues to “mature,” it will see slower growth rates than the double-digit and high single-digit 
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growth it has enjoyed for the past decade.118 Despite this rapidly growing GDP, China still lags 
far behind the United States in terms of GDP per capita at $8,132 compared to the United 
States $57,466.119 
Russia has seen its economy significantly impacted by recent sanctions related to their 
invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Additional sanctions have been enacted in 
response to their cyber-attacks during the 2016 Presidential race. The effect of these new 
sanctions on their economy has yet to be seen. In addition to economic sanction, the Russian 
economy has been hamstrung by low petroleum prices which were gouged in 2014, oil prices 
were gouged by nearly 70%, resulting in massive economic loss. 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP: 1991-2016. Data source: World Bank. 
                                                          
118 Nye, Is the American Century Over? 48. 
119 World Bank Database, GDP per capita. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD web, accessed 
720/2017 
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Figure 2. GDP: 1991-2016. Data source: World Bank.  
 
As of 2016, China has not reached the eighty percent threshold to be considered a 
challenger in this power category. With astonishingly high annual economic growth China has 
enjoyed over for more than a decade, it would not be outside of the realm of imagination to 
predict them to reach the challenger threshold in the near future. According to predictions 
made by Fortune magazine, China will surpass the U.S. economy by 2030.120 Similar forecasts 
have been made by Bloomberg LLC. which claim that China’s economy will surpass that of the 
U.S. even sooner with a prediction being made for 2026.121 
Russia’s gross domestic product falls far below that of both the United States and China. 
Russia faces continued economic sanction for its belligerence in Eastern Europe. Roughly two-
thirds of the Russian economy is oil and natural gas, both of which have seen dramatic price 
                                                          
120 Geoff Colvin, “Study: China will Overtake the U.S. as World’s Largest Economy Before 2030,” Fortune. *February 
09, 2017) http://fortune.com/2017/02/09/study-china-will-overtake-the-u-s-as-worlds-largest-economy-before-
2030/ Web, accessed 8/1/2017 
121 Malcom Scott and Cedric Sam, “China and the United States: Tale of Two Giant Economies,” Bloomberg L.P. 
(May 12, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-us-vs-china-economy/ Web. Accessed 9/2/2017 
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reductions. The Russian workforce and population are shrinking as birth rates fall and mortality 
rates rise resulting prediction of a demographic crisis in the future. In light of these challenges, 
Russia is not likely to challenge the United States or China in terms of economic power anytime 
in the near future.  
 
 
Figure 3. GDP: 2016. Data source: World Bank. 
 
With the exception of India or a unified Europe, no other actor can compare with the 
enormous population advantage held by China. The United States is hopelessly outmatched in 
terms of population size. At 1.38 billion as of 2016, China maintains a four-to-one population 
advantage over the United States, and a nearly ten-to-one advantage over Russia. China is sure 
to maintain this advantage over the United States for many years to come. 
The United States has little hope of competing with China in overall population. In 2016 
the United States saw its population growth rate fall to its lowest point since the 1930’s with a 
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growth rate of 0.693 percent.122 123 With proposals being made to rework the U.S immigration 
system to reduce legal immigration by as much as fifty percent, the population growth of the 
prevailing hegemon my see an even sharper decline.  
Russia has seen slow population growth over the last decade due to declining fertility 
rates and surprisingly low life expectancy for a modern advanced economy with males on 
average living only into their sixties.124 Russia’s population has fallen by approximately four 
million people since reaching its peak in 1994 and it is argued that Russia faces a looming 
demographic crisis as its population begins to shrink faster than immigration can replace the 
lost numbers.125   
 
 
Figure 4. Population 1991-2016. Data source: World Bank. 
                                                          
122 Niraj Chokshi, “Growth of U.S. Population is at Slowest Pace Since 1937,” New York Times. Dec. 22, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/22/us/usa-population-growth.html?mcubz=0 Web. Accessed 8/2/2017 
123World Bank Database, Population Growth (annual %) http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW  
124 Nye, Is the American Century Over, 34. 
125 Ibid. 
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Figure 5. Population:2016. Data source: World Bank. 
 
Following the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and at the Pentagon, 
the United States increased its military spending dramatically as it entered into two large scale 
conflicts and subsequent occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. The end of those two conflicts 
saw a decrease in American military spending as the wars ended and the U.S. has tried to 
reduce its annual deficit spending.  
 China has steadily increased its military spending since the 1990’s as it seeks to 
modernize its military and expand its hard power influence to its immediate surroundings. The 
increases in military spending has given China new ballistic missiles, its first aircraft carrier, an 
additional domestically built aircraft carrier, the J-20 stealth fighter, and multiple new military 
instillation on artificial islands in the South China Sea. It is important to note here that data on 
China’s military spending are effectively predictions due to mistrust of the Chinese 
government’s statistics reporting which are found to often be intentionally misleading.  
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 Russian military spending increased in the early 2000’s and have decreased since 2013, 
most likely due to the impact of continued economic sanctions. Russia has sought to modernize 
its military into a 21st century fighting force by refitting its navy, updating its nuclear forces, and 
modernizing its fighting equipment. The Russian government resisted reducing military 
spending following the imposing of sanctions, but they were forced to cut the military’s budget 
as economic pressure continued.126 
 
 
Figure 6. Military Spending: 1993-2016. Data source: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute 
 
China and Russia both have increased spending in recent years as they continue to 
modernize their respective militaries. However, neither China nor Russia have reached the 
eighty percent threshold to be considered a challenger in military spending. If the United States 
were to reduce its own military spending to levels closer to its pre-2001 spending, then it would 
                                                          
126 Stratfor, Worldview. “In Russia, Defense Cuts Were Inevitable.” https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/russia-
defense-cuts-were-inevitable  
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not be difficult to see China reach the challenger-threshold. However, with the continued fight 
against ISIL, an increasingly dangerous situation on the Korean Peninsula, and a Republican 
controlled government that has run on a platform of military expansion and modernization, it is 
not likely that we will see the U.S. willingly cut its military spending to such a degree as to allow 
China or Russia to challenge it. 
 
 
Figure 7. Military Spending: 2016. Data source: Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute. 
 
As of 2015, both China and Russia were above the threshold needed to be a challenger 
to the United States in this metric. China’s advantage in military personnel is such that the 
establishment of a new threshold relative to eighty percent of China’s standing military shows 
that neither the United States nor Russia would meet that mark to be considered challengers to 
China in this metric. This overwhelming advantage in numbers does not necessarily translate 
into guaranteed victory in a conflict. It does, however, demonstrate the China has a vast pool of 
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troops to call on, including millions of potential recruits thanks to their population advantage, in 
the case of a major conflict such as a hegemonic war.  
 
 
Figure 8. Military Personnel: 1992-2015. Data source: World Bank. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Military Personnel: 2015. Data source: World Bank. 
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In terms of naval capacity, China once again holds a significant advantage in terms of 
total number of vessels. When applying an eighty percent threshold to China’s naval capacity 
neither the U.S. or Russia meet the requirement to be considered a numerical challenger. Both 
China and Russia are seeking to modernize their navies. China currently operates one aircraft 
carrier and have nearly completed a second as well as upgrade its aging surface and submarine 
fleets. Russia is seeking to modernize its fleet, especially its ballistic missile submarines, and 
build as many as one hundred new warships and auxiliary vessels by 2020.127 Like military 
personnel, more available vessels do not necessarily translate into naval superiority or a 
guaranteed victory in conflict. However, it does speak to an important metric of national power 
and suggests that the actor in question seeks to expand their influence.   
 
 
Figure 10. Total naval capacity. Data source: Globalfirepower.com 
                                                          
127 Steve Micallef, The Ambitions and Challenges of Russia’s naval Modernization Program,” Center for 
International Maritime Security. (December 13, 2016) http://cimsec.org/ambitions-challenges-russias-naval-
modernization-program/30008 Web, accessed 8/4/2016 
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Raw steel and iron production are both dominated by China and have been for many 
years. Like population, the enormous advantage held by China dwarfs the production of both 
the United States and Russia combined. This enormous expansion of production has been 
attributed to the rapid expansion of the manufacturing sector in China, new major 
infrastructure projects, and market interference in the form of artificial currency controls which 
reduce competition to Chinese steel and iron firms.128 The United States has seen its own 
manufacturing industry shrink as companies moved their operations overseas in favor of lower 
labor costs and regulations.  
 
 
Figure 11. Raw steel production:  1991-2015. Data source: U.S. Geological Survey.  
 
                                                          
128 Micheal D. Fenton, “USGS Steel and Iron mineral year book 2006.” Page 37.2 
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China and Russia both have reached the required eighty percent threshold to be 
considered challengers to the U.S. China currently produces considerably more raw steel and 
iron ore than both Russia and the United States. When applying a secondary threshold at eighty 
percent relative to China’s production neither the US nor Russia meets that threshold in steel. 
Production of usable iron ore presents a similar situation in which the United States is vastly 
out-matched in terms of annual production. Both China and Russia surpass the challenger 
threshold and outproduce the U.S. by a margin of at least two-to-one. 
 
 
Figure 12. Iron ore production: 2014. Data source: U.S. Geological Survey. 
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Figure 13. Steel Production: 2015. Data source: U.S. Geological Survey. 
 
The United States was surpassed in petroleum production in 2003 as Russia expanded 
its oil and natural gas industry. The U.S. then overtook Russia in 2012 and dramatically 
increased its production over the next several years. China has consistently increased its 
petroleum production each year except for 2016 in which production fell. Unlike China’s 
overwhelming advantage in iron and steel production, petroleum production is far lower than 
both the United States and Russia.  
Neither China nor Russia has met the eighty percent threshold to be considered a 
challenger to the U.S. in the petroleum production metric. However, considering that Russia 
was able to surpass the United States and maintain a greater level of production for several 
years, it is not unfair to say that Russia may do so once again.   
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Figure 14. Petroleum Production 1992-2016. Data source: Energy Information Administration. 
 
 
Figure 15. Petroleum Production: 2016. Data source: Energy Information Administration. 
 
Due to data limitations, a time series comparison of energy consumption cannot be fully 
completed. Observing the available data, it can be seen that the United States was surpassed in 
energy consumption by China between 2009 and 2010. China has since increased its energy 
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production over subsequent five years. This increase in energy consumption can be attributed 
to China’s efforts to modernize its economy and infrastructure and to feed growing 
manufacturing industries.  
 
 
Figure 16. Primary energy consumption: 1991-2014. Data source: Energy Information 
Administration. 
 
Looking at the most recent data on primary energy consumption, it can be seen that the 
United States falls just short of reaching the threshold that would be used to determine the 
existence of a challenger if China were a hegemonic power. The U.S. is close enough however 
that it could easily cross the eighty percent mark in another year. Russia by contrast is well 
below the challenger threshold of the U.S. can China. 
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Figure 17. Primary energy consumption: 2014. Data source: Energy Information Administration. 
 
As their economy continues to develop and modernize, China has invested more into 
research and development. China has increased its research and development spending nearly 
tenfold since 2000. After including a polynomial line of fit for both the United States and China, 
it is clearly shown that based on historical spending trends, China will surpass the United States 
in R&D spending in only a few short years. The R2 for the line of fit on the Chinese data is 0.9962 
and the R2 value for the U.S. data line of fit is 0.9799 indicating that both lines represent the 
trend in the data very well.  
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Figure 18. Spending on research and development: 1991-2015. Data source: Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
 
Research and development spending is the last hard power metric observed amongst 
the three actors. The United States has dominated this metric in the past and continues to do 
so today. However, China has closed the gap significantly over the last decade and has passed 
the eighty percent threshold to be considered a challenger in this metric as of 2015. Russia 
spends comparatively very little on research and development and is not a challenger for either 
the U.S. or China in this particular category. 
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Figure 19. Spending on research and development: 2015. Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development. 
 
Soft Power 
Due to data limitations, I am unable to compare time series data for the three actors, 
and I am forced to rely on government sources for spending data on education. According to 
these government sources, China spent roughly eight times the amount on educational 
institutions that the United States had. The United States Department of Education was 
allocated approximately seventy billion dollars. While China appears to have outspent the 
United States by a considerable amount, the U.S. did succeed in outspending Russia by nearly 
seven-to-one. 
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Figure 20. Spending on education: 2016. Data source for the United States: U.S. Department of 
Education. Data for China: China Daily. Data for Russia: World Education News and Reviews 
 
The United States by far has provided more in foreign direct investment (FDI). China has 
been increasing its foreign direct investment by funding infrastructure projects in Africa, Asia, 
and South America. With the current rhetoric of the new Trump administration it is possible 
that the United States will cut its foreign direct investment in the years to come. If this is the 
case, then China may be looked to as a more willing source of investment by developing 
countries. Russian FDI has slowed in recent years and will likely remain low as their economy 
continues to feel the pressure of economic sanctions.   
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Figure 21. Foreign direct investment stocks: 2005-2016. Data source: Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development. 
  
 Graduation rates at the tertiary level has seen a substantial increase in China over the 
past decade and a half. China today has more graduates at the tertiary education level than 
both the United States and Russia combined and leads the world in the number of graduates 
each year. The United States has seen an increase in graduates as well, but was surpassed by 
China in 2003. According the most recent data, Russia experienced somewhat flat growth in the 
number of tertiary graduates and had a decline in graduates in 2012.   
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Figure 22. Graduates from tertiary education: 1999-2014. Data source: World Bank. 
  
The number Chinese citizens graduating from tertiary education far outweighs the 
number of graduates from wither the U.S. or Russia. This is in part due to Chinas enormous 
population and the movement of people into the middle class. The United States, as of 2012, 
does not meet the challenger threshold for this soft power metric. Likewise, Russia does not 
meet the challenger threshold for either the U.S. or China. 
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Figure 23. Graduates from tertiary education: 2012. Data source: World Bank. 
 
The United States continues to be the number one destination in the world for 
international students. This dominance is partly due to the quality of American academic 
institutions with 42 of the world’s top universities being located in the United States as of 
2016.129 While Russia and China have both seen a rise in the number of inbound international 
students, the United States has an enormous advantage over the other two actors. Neither 
China or Russia met the threshold to be considered a challenger in this metric of soft power.  
 
 
 
                                                          
129 “World University Rankings 2016-2017,” Times Higher Education.  
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/2017/world-
ranking#!/page/3/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/cols/stats  Web, accessed 08/08/2017 
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Figure 24. Inbound international students: 1999-2014. Data source: World Bank. 
 
 
Figure 25. Inbound international students: 2014. Data source: World Bank. 
   
In the last soft power metric, the United States has an overwhelming advantage in the 
media and entertainment industry. As of 2015, the United States media and entertainment 
industry produced $632 billion in revenue, compared to China and Russia’s 173.09 and 16 
billion respectively. China has the potential to become a major market for the media and 
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
1999200020012002200320042005200620072008200920102011201220132014
St
u
d
en
ts
Year
Inbound International Students: 1999-2014
USA China Russia
842384
108217
213347
673907.00
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
700000
800000
900000
USA China Russia
St
u
d
en
ts
Country
Inbound International Students: 2014
Inbound Students
80% Threshold USA
81 
 
 
entertainment industry due to its massive population and their growing middle class. They are 
also seeing a rapid growth in their media and entertainment sector which is expected to reach 
$242 billion by 2019.130 Despite China’s potential to be a new major market for the 
entertainment industry, it does not meet the eighty percent threshold.  
 
 
Figure 26. Size of media and entertainment industry in 2015 in USD. Data source for United 
States: SelectUSA. Data for China: United States Department of Commerce, International Trade 
Administration. Data for Russia: PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
 
The global trade openness index shows a positive trend toward increased trade and 
global commerce. However, there is a significant drop that occurs in 2009 and the onset of the 
so-called Great Recession. Global trade recovers after the fall, but has since stalled and steadily 
declined and declined again in 2012, 2013, and 2015. After adding in a polynomial line of fit, a 
slight downward trend can be observed beginning around 2012 and continuing to decline. This 
                                                          
130 Andrea DaSilva, 2016 Top Markets Report Media and Entertainment. (October 2016) 
http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Media_and_Entertainment_Top_Markets_Report.pdf Web, accessed 
08/08/2017 
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line of fit has an R2 of 0.9365 indicating it is a strong fit to the data. This would appear to 
indicate the global trade openness has begun to decline and will continue to do so if it 
continues on its current trend. 
 
Liberal Hegemonic Order 
 
Figure 27. Trade openness index. Data source: World Bank.  
 
The narrative from Freedom House describing the current state of democracy in the 
world is not one which inspires hope and courage. Rather, their tracking of freedom and 
democracy indicators show a world increasingly slipping into authoritarianism and populist 
nationalism. Their most recent publication, Freedom In the World 2017, Populists and 
Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy, claims that the world is seeing more countries 
pull away from democracy and embrace nationalism. For the 11th year in a row, more countries 
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have seen a decline in democratic indicators than those that have seen an increase. According 
to the report: 
“All of these developments point to a growing danger that the international order of the 
past quarter-century—rooted in the principles of democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law—will give way to a world in which individual leaders and nations pursue their own 
narrow interests without meaningful constraints, and without regard for the shared 
benefits of global peace, freedom, and prosperity.”131  
 
The report makes the point that previous years that experienced aggregate declines in 
democracy saw decline focused on autocracies descending deeper into autocratic rule. 
However, recent years, 2016 especially, saw democratic decline occur to a greater degree in 
previously free democracies. A quarter of the 67 countries that experienced democratic 
declines were in Europe where America has at minimum maintained a regional hegemony.  
The report goes on to say that Russia’s interference in the elections of multiple actors, 
including the United States, has threatened the democracies of central Europe. The expansion 
of China’s military into the South China Sea despite a ruling by and international tribunal 
demonstrates China’s desire for increased regional influence at the expense of international 
law and norms. The election of Donald Trump to the America presidency has also aroused fears 
that the United States will withdraw from its position as the global proponent of democratic 
values. Donald Trump made the claim that if he lost the election would have been rigged, his 
insistence that his political opponent be imprisoned, and his position of allowing Russia to 
control the outcome of Syria and possibly Ukraine have all cast doubt on America’s 
                                                          
131 Freedom in the World 2017, “Populists and Autocrats: The Duel Threat to Global Democracy.” Freedom House.  
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017 Web. Accessed 0710/2016 
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commitment to the liberal world order. Democracy and human rights, the report claims, can no 
longer be argued to be core tenets of American foreign policy.132  
  
 
Figure 28. Freedom House measurements of declines in democracy.  
 
Security aid provided by the United States has increased since the early 2000s, largely 
thanks to the ongoing war on terror. Prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. spent far less 
on security aid to foreign actors. Like the trade openness index, the data at first glance appears 
to indicate a slow and steady rise in US security aid provision. However, when adding a 
polynomial line of fit, a significant downward trend appears. The line of fit has an R2 of 0.8021 
indicating it is a moderately strong fit to the data. According to the line of fit, should American 
security aid trends continue, the U.S. will continue to reduce its security aid commitments.  
                                                          
132 Freedom in the World 2017, “Populists and Autocrats: The Duel Threat to Global Democracy.” Freedom House.  
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017 Web. Accessed 0710/2016 
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Figure 29. US security aid. Data source: Security Assistance Monitor.  
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CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION 
This thesis is intended to contribute to the existing literature by providing a clear picture 
of the decline in national power of a prevailing hegemon, the ascension of legitimate 
challenger, and the erosion of a hegemonic order as a result. By setting a relative power 
threshold equal to eighty percent of the prevailing hegemons power, a potential legitimate 
challenger could be identified by their share of the distribution of power. Should there be a 
challenger to American hegemony, then the we should see the United States hegemony begin 
to erode as the hegemon becomes unwilling or unable to uphold the status quo. The challenger 
will simultaneously try and establish its own hegemonic order reflecting its policy preferences 
and norms. 
The United States maintains a preeminence in multiple metrics of both hard and soft 
power. The U.S. continues to possess the largest economy in the world with a GDP over $18 
trillion. While the U.S. Has been surpassed in terms of population and standing army size, it 
spends more on its military than the next fifteen countries combined, including both China and 
Russia.133 The U.S. attracts more international students than any other country and maintains 
an enormous advantage in R&D spending. Having observed fifteen quintessential metrics of 
power identified by previous authors and myself as having a strong impact on the ability of an 
actor to influence others, the United States saw a decline in power in eight of those fifteen. 
Seven of these would constitute a relative decline with either China or Russia closing the gap 
with the U.S. One metric, military spending, saw an absolute decline starting in 2011 due to the 
                                                          
133 “Military expenditure by country, in constant (2015) US$ m,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Milex-constant-2015-USD.pdf Web, Accessed 07/016/2016 
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sequestration cuts included in the 2011 budget. A decline in a majority of power metrics with 
most of those declines being considered relative declines supports my first hypothesis. 
China has increased its power capabilities over the past twenty years, dramatically in 
some cases. China continues to maintain the largest population and standing military in the 
world, and while their GDP does not reach the eighty percent challenger threshold, it has seen 
considerable growth for years and has lifted China to the rank of the second largest global 
economy. Economic forecasts predict that continued growth will propel the Chinese economy 
to the number one spot within two decades or sooner. While china falls short in petroleum 
production, it dominates the market in iron ore and raw steel production and has surpassed the 
U.S. in primary energy consumption. Increases in research and development spending has 
made China a competitor to the U.S. which has dominated R&D for years. A massive population 
has meant high education spending and an increasing number of graduates in higher education. 
Of the fifteen metrics of power that were observed, China has either surpassed the 
United States or could be considered a challenger in nine of them which supports my second 
hypothesis. This result would appear to reinforce the claim made by numerous authors that 
China is a challenger to U.S. hegemony and is the most likely actor to replace U.S. hegemony in 
the future. 
Observation of national power metrics demonstrates Russia is not a viable challenger to 
American hegemony on a global scale. While Russia has demonstrated an ability to affect their 
neighbors, it is unlikely that they will be able to establish a solid sphere of influence as they had 
during the Cold War. After the Russian invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia found itself 
largely isolated in the global community. Its neighbors continued to seek the help of NATO for 
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their protection, and economic sanctions have been leveled against Russia which have had a 
visible effect on their economic growth. They have the ability to influence their neighbors, 
however, not to the effect of establishing any form of regional hegemony. With only being able 
to challenge the United States in four of the fifteen observable power metrics, my third 
hypothesis predicting Russia to not be a legitimate challenger appears to be supported.  
The three core tenets of the liberal hegemonic order identified as being central to 
American hegemony were trade openness, the spread of liberal democracy, and the security 
guarantee of the United States. The data shows that all three of these categories have begun to 
decline. Trade openness, measured by observing the value of international trade as a 
percentage of GDP, showed a steady increase followed by a slow decrease. Inserting a 
polynomial line of fit shows that this declination trend is likely to continue. It is possible that 
trade openness could start to decline at a greater rate as economic nationalism has risen 
sharply in recent years as people see their countries as being taken advantage of or held back 
by globalism and trade. The exit of Great Britain from the European Union was an explosive 
exercise in this fact as Britain saw itself as being taken advantage of, and chose to remove itself 
from the political-economic union. Similarly, the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans 
Pacific Partnership as well as the insistence by the new administration that NAFTA must be 
renegotiated stands as further additional evidence to this point.  
Global democracy is experiencing an alarming downward trend. Eleven consecutive 
years of decline in democratic values and policies around the world indicates that the United 
States is either unwilling or unable to maintain this core principle of the liberal hegemonic 
order. Partly to increasing nationalism, partly to interstate and intrastate conflict, democratic 
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values and institutions have begun to recede in favor of more autocratic and authoritarian 
policies. Under the administration of President Donald Trump, the U.S. is not likely to attempt 
to refocus on spreading democracy based on some of the rhetoric that has come from the 
current president.      
While the United States continues to outspend the world in military spending, its 
commitment to its traditional position as global security grantor has been called into question. 
The new administration has expressed repeated skepticism of NATO, the landmark defense 
institution of American hegemony, and of our allies. Some of these allies have perceived the 
new “America first” policies of the Trump administration as a signal that they need to rely on 
themselves for their own security.  
In addition to questioning our own place as the global source of security, we are seeing 
the establishment of new security apparatuses by potential challengers and allies alike. The 
most obvious challenge the United States faces is the regional aggression shown by the Russian 
Federation. Rather than just engaging in positioning and posturing, Russia has gone as far as to 
invade a neighbor, annex strategic territory, resume Cold War era bomber patrols, and carry 
out numerous cyber-attacks against the U.S. And its allies. 
China has expanded its military reach by claiming and creating islands in the South China 
Sea, allowing them to potentially establish military control over high traffic trade routes. China 
has also opened and garrisoned its first overseas military base in Djibouti. While this single base 
pales in comparison to the dozens of bases maintained by the United States, it does signify an 
intent by a rival state and challenger to expand their military reach. 
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With declines observed in global trade openness, democratic indicators, and U.S. global 
security indicators, the analysis supports my fourth, fifth, and sixth hypotheses. This ultimately 
lends weight to the argument that the liberal hegemonic order of the United States is beginning 
to erode as the U.S. observes a relative decline in national power, reducing its ability to enforce 
or maintain that order. This would appear to contradict the claims made by authors such as 
John Ikenberry and Robert Keohane who argued that the liberal economic order would remain 
stable in the face of American decline. 
Additional Research 
 An important area where additional research can be conducted is in the dynamics of 
different power metrics. If one can establish a way of empirically weighing the impact of one 
measure of national power against another, this could revolutionize the way in which 
geopolitics is studied and hegemons are assessed. An ordering or weighing of the impact of 
different capabilities could also help us to understand the effects of both relative and absolute 
decline on influential actors and how potential challengers may seek to expand their influence.  
One additional area that will require better understanding in the future is in the effect 
of technology on hegemony. As Gramsci articulates, one of the most important factors in 
establishing and maintaining hegemony is to control the narrative and thereby being able to 
influence policy preferences. Innovations like the internet and cell phone have changed the way 
in which soft power can be applied in the economy and global politics. As more of the global 
population gain access to the information super highway, thereby making instantaneous 
communication and information becomes more accessible, how will this affect the ability of a 
hegemonic actor to control the message and influence others through soft power?  
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION  
  The purpose of my thesis was to examine the prospect of United States hegemonic 
decline through an analysis of national power capabilities along with indicators of the liberal 
economic order. Specifically, I intended to explore whether the United States has experienced a 
relative decline in national power capability which, according to hegemonic stability theory, 
would coincide with a decline of the international system established by the U.S.  
 After observing fifteen metrics of national power it is clear that the United States has 
experienced a relative decline in national power in a majority of those observations. Thanks to 
high GDP growth in China, the gap between the U.S. and Chinese economy is shrinking with 
every passing year. With their enormous advantage in population, they have the potential to 
see even greater economic success as their economy modernizes and more of their population 
enter the middle class. China leads the world in the production of raw iron and steel and in the 
consumption of energy. Their military is continuing to modernize and challenge the United 
States by claiming additional islands, deploying new missiles meant to sink U.S. carriers, and 
carrying out cyber-attacks against U.S. businesses and infrastructure. China has also begun 
investing in expanding its soft power to become more appealing to foreign actors, and have 
begun to establish their own economic institutions with the creation of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the New Development Bank. Soft power expansion, multi-national 
economic institutions, and military expansion are all hallmarks of a rising power seeking to 
establish its own hegemony as the prevailing hegemon sees its power advantage continue to 
dwindle. World leaders will need to contend with the fact that the United States will not be the 
superpower forever. Eventually, a rising challenger will establish its own global order based on 
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its practices and norms. The United States must decide how it will react to decline, whether to 
acquiesce to new leadership, or seek to punish the challengers and risk a new hegemonic war.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
93 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
International Trade Administration, “2016 Top Markets Report: Media and Entertainment,” 
 United States Department of Commerce, October 2016. 
 http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Media_and_Entertainment_Top_Markets_Report.pdf 
 
“2017 United States Military Strength,” Globalfirepower.com. accessed March 24, 2017, 
http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
detail.asp?country_id=united-states-of-america 
“2017 Russia Military Strength,” Globalfirepower.com. accessed March 24, 2017, 
 http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
 detail.asp?country_id=russia#powerindex  
“2017 China Military Strength,” Globalfirepower.com. accessed March 24, 2017, 
 http://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-
 detail.asp?country_id=china  
 
Bocock, Robert. Hegemony. New York: Tavistock Publications, 1986.  
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power. New York: Basic 
Books, 2012. 
Catley, Bob. "Hegemonic America: The Benign Superpower?" Contemporary Southeast Asia 18, 
no. 4 (1997): 377-399. 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Andrew Jorgenson, Thomas E. Reifer, and Shoon Lio, "The Trajectory 
of the United States in the World System: A Quantitative Reflection." Sociological 
Perspectives 48, no. 2 (2005): 233-254. 
Chase-Dunn, Christopher, Roy Kwon, Kirk Lawrence, and Hiroko Inoue. "Last of the hegemons: 
U.S. decline and global governance." International Review of Modern Sociology 37, no.1 
(2011): 1-29. 
"China increases education spending in 2016," Chinadaily.com. May 4, 2017, 
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-05/04/content_29203196.htm 
Clark, Ian. "Bringing Hegemony Back in: The United States and International Order." 
International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009): 23-36. 
Potapova Elizaveta, "Education in the Russian Federation," World Education News and Reviews 
 June 6, 2017, https://wenr.wes.org/2017/06/education-in-the-russian-federation  
Fontana, Benedetto. "State and Society: The Concept of Hegemony in Gramsci." In Hegemony 
and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, edited by Mark Haugaard 
and Howard H. Lentner. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006. 
94 
 
 
"FDI Stocks," The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, accessed July 14, 
  2017, https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-stocks.htm 
Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987. 
Gilpin, Robert. "The Theory of Hegemonic War." The MIT Press 18, no. 4 (1988): 591-613. 
"Global Entertainment and Media Outlook 2016-2020," PricewaterhouseCoopers, accessed July 
  5, 2017. https://www.pwc.ru/en/publications/media-outlook.html 
"Gross domestic spending on R&D," The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
 Development. accessed July 14, 2017,    
 https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm 
Ikenberry, John. "Liberal Hegemony or Empire? American Power in the Age of Unipolarity." In 
American Power in the 21st Century, edited by David Held and Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004. 
Ikenberry, John. "The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America." 
Foreign Affairs  90, no. 3 (2011): 56-68. 
"International Energy Statistics: Total Petroleum and Other Liquids Production 2016 ," Energy 
 Information Administration. accessed June 5, 2017,
 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=000gfs000000000000000
 0000000000000vg&c=000000020000000000000000000000000000000400000002&ct=0
 &tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.53-1-CHN-TBPD.A&vo=0&v=H&end=2016&s=INTL.53-1-CHN-
 TBPD.A  
"International Energy Statistics: Total Primary Energy Consumption," Energy Information 
 Administration. accessed June 5, 2017, 
 https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=000gfs000000000000000
 0000000000000vg&c=000000020000000000000000000000000000000400000002&ct=0
 &tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.53-1-CHN-TBPD.A&vo=0&v=H&end=2016&s=INTL.53-1-CHNTBPD.A  
"Iron and Steel Statistics and Information," United States Geological Survey. accessed March 21, 
  2017, https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/iron_&_steel/  
"Iron Ore Statistics and Information," United States Geological Survey. accessed March 20, 
 2017, https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/iron_ore/  
Joffe, Josef. "The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America's Decline." Foreign Affairs 88, 
no. 5 (2009): 21-35. 
Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. 
95 
 
 
Kupchan, Charles A. "The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to 
Pax Americana." Security Studies 23, no. 2 (2014): 219-257. 
Layne, Christopher. "Impotent Power? Re-examining the Nature of America's Hegemonic 
Power." National Interest no. 85(2006): 41-48. 
Mead, Walter Russell. "The Tea Party, Populism, and the Domestic Culture of U.S. Foreign 
Policy." In The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, by 
James M. McCormick. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2012. 
Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001. 
"Media and Entertainment Spotlight: The Media and Entertainment Industry in the United 
  States," SelectUSA.gov, accessed June 19, 2017, https://www.selectusa.gov/media-
 entertainment-industry-united-states 
Milner, Helen V. "International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability." Foreign Policy 
no. 110 (1998): 112-123. 
Modelski, George. Long Cycles in World Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1973. 
Nye, Joseph S. "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power." Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (2009): 
160-163. 
Nye, Joseph S. Is The American Century Over? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015. 
Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 
2004. 
Nye, Jospeh S. The Future of Power. New York: Public Affairs, 2011. 
Organski, A.F.K. World Politics. Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1968. 
Puddington, Arch and Tyler Roylance. "Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global 
 Democracy," Freedom House, accessed June 18, 2017. 
 https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf 
"Russia Wants 'Pragmatic' Ties with US and a 'Post-West World Order'" Associated Press, 
accessed February 18, 2017. http://nypost.com/2017/02/18/russia-wants-pragmatic-
relations-with-us/. 
“Right Direction or Wrong Track.” Rasmussen Reports.  12 March, 2017. 
 http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/top_stories/right_direction
 _wrong_track_apr3  
96 
 
 
Saad, Lydia. “Americans See China as Top Economy Now, but U.S. in Future.” Gallup. 22 
 February, 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/189347/americans-china-top-economy-
 future.aspx 
Schleicher, Charles P. Introduction to International Relations. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1954. 
"Security Aid Pivot Table," Security Assistance Monitor, Accessed March 12, 2017. 
 https://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/2000/2016/all/ 
 Global/ 
Smith, Martin A. Power in the Changing Global Order: The U.S., Russia, and China. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2012. 
Snyder, Jack. "The Myths of Empire and Strategies of Hegemony." In Lessons of Empire: Imperial 
Histories and American Power, edited by Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. 
Moore, 270-282. New York: The New Press, 2006. 
"SIPRI Military Expenditure Database," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
 accessed March 10, 2017. https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex   
Tammen, Ronald L., Jacek Kugler, Douglas Lemke, Allan C. Stam III, Mark Abdollahian, Carole 
Alsharabati, Brian Efird, and A.F.K. Organski. Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st 
Century. New York: Seven Bridges Press LLC, 2000. 
"The World Fact Book: Middle East: Qatar," CIA.com, accessed June 15, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html.  
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business, 1991, 
Washington D.C. 
U.S. Department of Education. FY 2016 Education Budget Fact Sheet, 2016, accessed July 1, 
  2017, https://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget16/budget-factsheet.pdf 
"World Development Indicators: GDP." The World Bank.    
 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.CD& 
 country  
"World Development Indicators: Population." The World Bank. 
 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL& 
  country=   
The World Bank. "World Development Indicators: Military personnel." The World Bank. 
 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=MS.MIL.TOTL.P1& 
 country=  
"World Development Indicators: Inbound international students." The World Bank. 
 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Report_Name=Tertiary- 
 Education&Id=2c670ebf#   
97 
 
 
"World Development Indicators: Tertiary level graduates." The World Bank. 
 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=education-statistics-~-all-
 indicators&preview=on   
"World Development Indicators: Trade Openness Index." The World Bank. 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?end=2016&start=1991 
Vezirgiannidou, Sevesti-Eleni. "The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-Hegemonic Global 
Order." International Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013): 635-631. 
Volgy, Thomas J., Kieth A. Grant, and Elizabeth Faussett. "Searching for Changing Global 
Transition: Where is the Post-Cold War Order." in Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, 
and Future, edited by William R. Thompson, 101-130. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel M. World Systems Analysis. Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 
Watson, Adam. Hegemony and History. Routledge: New York, 2007. 
 
 
  
 
